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Abstract	  
This	   paper	   aims	   to	   assess	   court	  decisions	   for	   erradicating	   corruption	   in	   Indonesia.	   The	  data	   are	  based	  on	  
Indonesia	   Supreme	   court	   decisions	   from	   year	   2001	   to	   year	   2009.	   The	   data	   set	   comprises	   of	   549	   cases	  
involving	  831	  defendants.	  After	  the	  end	  of	  Suharto’s	  regime,	  the	  Anti	  Corruption	  Bill	  was	  ratified	  in	  1999	  and	  
was	  refined	  in	  2001.	  As	  Indonesia	  follows	  civil	  law	  system,	  legal	  certainty	  has	  been	  manifested	  by	  stating	  the	  
level	  of	  punishment	  clearly	  for	  each	  type	  of	  offences	  in	  the	  Bill.	  Despite	  a	  clear	  guidance	  on	  the	  intensity	  of	  
punishments	  for	  each	  corruption	  types,	  judges’	  decisions	  on	  the	  intensity	  of	  punishments	  sentenced	  across	  
defendants	   are	   far	   from	   consistent.	   Using	   logistic	   regressions,	  we	   found	   that	   the	   probability	   of	   judges	   in	  
sentencing	   defendants	   with	   financial	   punishments	   (i.e.	   fines,	   compensation	   and	   the	   seizure	   of	   evidence)	  
does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	   level	  of	  economic	   losses	   inflicted	  by	  the	  defendants.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	   judges’	  
decisions	   tend	   to	  be	  more	   lenient	   toward	  defendants	  with	  particular	  occupations	  but	  harsher	   toward	   the	  
others.	  The	  intensity	  of	  punishments	  has	  been	  sentenced	  idiosyncratically	  and	  has	  weakened	  the	  deterrence	  
effect	  of	  the	  punishments.	  In	  estimating	  the	  social	  cost	  of	  corruption,	  prosecutors	  have	  estimated	  only	  the	  
explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption,	   therefore	   the	   impact	   of	   corruption	   to	   Indonesia	   economy	   is	   under	  
underestimated.	   Brand	   and	   Price	   (2000)	   defined	   that	   the	   social	   costs	   of	   crime	   includes	   the	   costs	   in	  
anticipation	  of	  crime,	  the	  costs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  crime	  and	  the	  costs	  in	  reaction	  of	  crime.	  The	  total	  explicit	  cost	  
of	   corruption	   from	  2001	   to	  2009	  was	  Rp	  73.1	   trillion	   (about	  US	  $8.49	  billion),	  however	   the	   total	   financial	  
punishment	   imposed	  by	  the	  supreme	  court	  was	  Rp	  5.33	  trillion	  (about	  US$619.77	  million).	  The	  data	  show	  
that	   corruption	   is	   mostly	   committed	   by	   people	   with	   medium-­‐high	   income	   and	   they	   usually	   have	   good	  
careers.	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1.	  Introduction	  In	   the	   deterrence	   theory	   literature,	   the	   debate	   primarily	   focuses	   on	  whether	   increasing	   the	  severity	   of	   punishment	   is	   effective	   in	   deterring	   individuals	   in	   committing	   an	   offence.	   It	   is	  assumed	  that	  any	  potential	  offender	  is	  rational	  and	  committing	  an	  offence	  is	  a	  rational	  choice.	  Individuals	  are	  going	  to	  commit	  an	  offence	   if	   the	  expected	  benefits	  of	   the	  activity	  exceed	  the	  expected	   costs	   of	   offending.	   Consequently,	   in	   order	   to	   deter	   individual	   from	   committing	   an	  offence,	   the	   authority	   may	   increase	   the	   expected	   costs	   of	   offending	   bourned	   by	   potential	  offenders.	  	  A	   group	   of	   economists	   tend	   to	   use	   decision	   theory	   in	   order	   to	   analyse	   on	   why	   individuals	  commit	  an	  offence	  and	  on	  how	  to	  deter	  individuals	  from	  committing	  such	  activity.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	   the	   severity	   of	   punishment	   does	   matter	   in	   deterring	   individuals	   from	   committing	   an	  offence.	   This	   approach	   is	   pionerred	  by	  Becker,	   1968	   and	   excellent	   literature	   surveys	   in	   this	  area	  have	  been	   conducted	  by	   various	   authors	   including	  Garoupa	   (1997),	   Eide	   (2000,	   2004),	  Bowles	  (2000)	  and	  Polinsky	  and	  Shavell	  (2000,	  2007).	  The	  other	  group	  of	  economists	   tend	  to	  use	  game	  theory	   in	  analysing	  phenomena	   in	  criminal	  justice.	   Tsebelis	   (1989,	   1991,	   1993)	   pionereed	   in	   using	   this	   approach	   and	   argued	   that	   any	  attempt	   to	   increase	   the	   severity	   of	   punishment	   reduced	   the	   probability	   of	   criminal	   justice	  authority	  in	  enforcing	  the	  law	  but	  it	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  probability	  of	  individuals	  from	  offending.	  This	  counter	  intuitive	  result	  triggered	  a	  long	  debate	  involving	  several	  authors	  including	  Bianco	  (1990),	   Ordeshook	   (1990),	   Weissing	   and	   Ostrom	   (1991),	   Hirshleifer	   and	   Rasmusen	   (1992)	  and	   Andreozzi	   (2004).	   Pradiptyo	   (2007)	   refined	   the	   inspection	   game	   proposed	   by	   Tsebelis	  (1989)	  and	   	   showed	   that	   there	   is	  not	   so	  much	  discrepancy	   in	   the	  solution	  between	  decision	  theory	   and	   game	   theoretical	   approaches.	   Pradiptyo	   (2007)	   showed	   that	   any	   attempt	   to	  increase	   the	   severity	   of	   punishment	   is	   going	   to	   reduce	   the	   likelihood	   of	   offending	   if	   certain	  conditions	  hold.	  In	  addition,	  he	  proved	  that	  crime	  prevention	  initiatives	  are	  more	  effective	  in	  reducing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  offending	  in	  comparison	  to	  increasing	  the	  severity	  of	  punishment.	  	  Attempts	   to	   increase	   the	   expected	   costs	   of	   offending	   can	  be	   conducted	   in	   several	  ways.	  The	  criminal	   justice	   authority	  may	   endeavour	   either	   to	   increase	   the	   probability	   of	   detection,	   or	  alternatively,	  they	  may	  increase	  the	  severity	  of	  punishment.	  Indeed	  both	  possible	  scenarios	  are	  costly.	   In	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	   optimum	   level	   of	   deterrence,	   however,	   the	   criminal	   justice	  authority	  has	   two	  possible	  scenarios	  either	  by	  setting	   low	  probability	  of	  detection	  combined	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with	  high	  intensity	  of	  punishment	  or	  by	  setting	  high	  probability	  of	  detection	  together	  with	  low	  intensity	  of	  punishment.	  	  A	  similar	  approach	  as	  mentioned	  above	  can	  be	  used	   in	  eradicating	  corruption.	  Any	  potential	  corruptor	   is	   rational	  and	  accordingly	   they	  conducted	  costs-­‐benefits	  analysis	  prior	   to	  commit	  corruption.	  As	  applicable	  to	  other	  type	  of	  offences,	  the	  intensity	  of	  corruption	  can	  be	  divided	  into	   several	   groups	   for	   instance	   small,	   medium	   and	   large	   scales	   of	   corruption.	   The	  classification	   of	   the	   groups	   depends	   on	   the	   intensity	   of	  misallocation	   of	   resources	   owing	   to	  corruption	   in	  Indonesia.	  There	  are	  various	  types	  of	  punishment	   for	  corruptors,	  ranging	  from	  imprisonment,	  fines,	  compensation	  order	  and	  the	  seizure	  of	  the	  illegitimate	  assets.	  In	  several	  countries,	  corruptors	  may	  receive	  capital	  punishment.	  In	  ideal	  world,	  the	  higher	  the	  intensity	  of	  corruption,	  the	  higher	  the	  probability	  of	  corruptors	  to	  receive	  harsher	  punishments.	  	  	  One	  aspect	  in	  the	  deterrence	  theory	  that	  has	  not	  been	  received	  sufficient	  attention	  is	  the	  role	  of	  consistency	  of	  court	  decisions.	  The	  consistency	  of	  court	  decisions	  builds	  reputation	  of	   the	  criminal	   justice	  system	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  is	  going	  to	  affect	  the	  deterrence	  effect	  for	  any	  act	  imposed.	  The	  consistency	  of	  court	  decisions	  with	  the	  type	  and	  intensity	  of	  punishments	  may	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  penal	  system	  that	  has	  been	  embraced	  across	  countries.	  	  	  This	  chapter	  aims	  to	  assess	  court	  decisions	  for	  the	  case	  of	  corruption	  in	  Indonesia.	  The	  study	  uses	  549	  cases,	  involving	  831	  defendants,	  which	  have	  been	  sentenced	  by	  the	  Supreme	  court	  of	  the	  Republic	  Indonesia	  in	  2001-­‐2009.	  All	  cases	  have	  been	  published	  in	  the	  official	  website	  of	  the	  supreme	  court	  in	  in	  the	  following	  URL:	  http://putusan	  .mahkamahagung.go.id.	  
2.	  Corruption	  Erradication	  Programmes	  in	  Indonesia	  Various	  attempts	  have	  been	  made	  by	  the	  Government	  of	  Indonesia	  (GoI)	  to	  tackle	  corruption.	  Back	  in	  1950s,	  during	  President	  Soekarno’s	  era,	  the	  GoI	  had	  launched	  a	  programme	  to	  tackle	  corruption.	   Similarly,	   under	   President	   Suharto’s	   era	   in	   1970s	   until	  mid	   1990s,	   the	   GoI	   also	  launched	   several	   programmes	   to	   eradicate	   corruption.	   Nevertheless	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	  programmes	  was	  questioned	  as	  both	  presidents	  tend	  to	  embrace	  absolute	  power,	  which	  tend	  to	  be	  corrupt.	  	  After	  President	  Suharto	  stepped	  down	  in	  1998,	  Indonesia	  had	  been	  undergoing	  reformations	  in	  various	  aspects	  including	  politic,	  economy	  and	  law.	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  reformations	  was	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  Figure	  1:	  Various	  programmes	  in	  combating	  corruption	  in	  Indonesia	  A	  preventive	  measure	  to	  reduce	  corruption	  by	  civil	  servants	   is	  the	   initiation	  of	   	  bureaucratic	  reformation	   programmes	   since	   2003.	   The	   programme	   has	   been	   initiated	   for	   the	   first	   time	  within	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Finance.	   The	   programme	   provides	   substantial	   improvement	   on	   civil	  servant	   salary	  but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   the	   transparency	  of	   civil	   servant	  performance	  has	  been	  promoted.	  Currently,	  most	  government	  departments	  have	  embraced	  bureaucratic	  reformation.	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Indonesia	  follows	  civil	  law,	  which	  has	  been	  influenced	  by	  the	  Dutch	  since	  colonial	  era.	  Criminal	  Code	   of	   Indonesia	   (KUHP)	   has	   been	   used	   in	   Indonesia.	   Although	   Indonesia	   has	   declared	   its	  independent	  since	  1945,	  but	  its	  penal	  code	  is	  still	  based	  on	  the	  Dutch	  Criminal	  Code	  in	  1811	  (Wetboek	   van	   Strafrecht).	   Ironically,	   the	   Dutch	   no	   longer	   implement	   the	   code	   as	   they	   has	  embraced	  a	  new	  code	  since	  1979.	  	  Corruption	   is	   an	   extra	   ordinary	   crime	   and	   there	  was	   a	   need	   to	   create	   a	   special	  measure	   to	  tackle	  corruption	  by	  creating	  anti	  corruption	  act.	  	  The	  anti	  corruption	  act	  has	  been	  ractified	  in	  1999,	  although	  it	  was	  refined	  in2001.	  In	  essence,	  both	  laws	  are	  similar	  and	  the	  only	  difference	  is	   that	   the	   intensity	   of	   punishment	   of	   the	   latter	   do	   not	   refer	   to	   Criminal	   Code	   of	   Indonesia	  (KUHP)	   which	   is	   based	   on	   the	   Dutch	   Criminal	   Code	   in	   1811	   (Wetboek	   van	   Strafrecht)	   any	  longer3.	  	  The	  KPK	  is	  an	  independent	  body	  financed	  by	  the	  the	  government	  and	  the	  main	  task	  of	  the	  KPK	  is	   to	  eradicate	  and	  to	  prevent	  corruption	   in	   Indonesia.	   It	   seems	  KPK	  tasks	  may	  overlap	  with	  police	   and	   prosecutors,	   however,	   KPK	   deals	   only	   with	   large	   scale	   corruption	   cases	   (i.e,	   the	  value	  of	  the	  corruption	  is	  at	  least	  Rp1	  billion	  (US$	  116,279).	  Below	  the	  threshold,	  corruption	  cases	  is	  going	  to	  be	  dealt	  by	  police	  and	  district	  prosecutors.	  	  	  
3.	  The	  Complexity	  of	  Corruption	  in	  Indonesia	  A	  survey	  by	  Hong	  Kong-­‐based	  Political	  &	  Economic	  Risk	  Consultancy	  Ltd	  in	  2010	  placed	  Indonesia	  as	  the	  most	  corrupt	  country	  in	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region.	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  problems	  of	  corruption	  in	  Indonesia	  is	  more	  acute	  then	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  region	  such	  as	  Cambodia,	  the	  Philipines,	  India,	  Thailand	  and	  Vietnam.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Corruption	  Perception	  Index	  in	  2010	  by	  the	  Transparency	  International	  placed	  Indonesia	  as	  the	  110th	  country	  out	  of	  178	  countries	  in	  the	  world.	  	  Question	  may	  be	  raised	  on	  how	  serious	  it	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  corruption	  in	  Indonesia.	  Figure	  2	  shows	  the	  model	  of	  complexity	  of	  corruption	  in	  Indonesia.	  The	  corruption	  may	  start	  from	  stage	  1	  whereby	  an	  individual	  committed	  an	  offence	  (either	  conventional	  offence	  or	  even	  a	  corruption).	  	  At	  this	  stage,	  potential	  offenders	  interact	  with	  police	  by	  playing	  an	  inspection	  game.	  The	  potential	  offenders	  have	  two	  alternative	  strategies,	  offence	  and	  not	  offence,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3For	  instance,	  the	  maximum	  fines	  according	  to	  Criminal	  Code	  of	  Indonesia	  for	  certain	  offences	  may	  only	  be	  in	  the	  range	  
of	  several	  hundreds	  rupiah,	  which	  is	  almost	  neglible	  in	  term	  of	  value.	  In	  the	  Anti	  Corruption	  Act	  20/2001,	  the	  fines	  has	  
been	  adjusted	  to	  year	  2000	  values,	  and	  the	  maximum	  fines	  is	  Rp	  1	  billion	  or	  approximately	  US	  $	  100,000.	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whereas	  the	  policemen	  have	  also	  two	  strategies,	  inspect	  and	  not	  inspect.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  in	  this	  model,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  game	  is	  played	  by	  representative	  agent.	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Extorts money from 
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is closed 
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is referred to 
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outside, having a mobile 
phone, and have a  
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room designed 
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Prosecutor with 
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evidence
	  Figure	  2:	  Modelling	  the	  complexity	  of	  corruption	  in	  Indonesia	  Suppose	   in	   Stage	   1	   an	   individual	   commits	   a	   corruption	   while	   the	   police	   inspects,	   then	   the	  individual	  is	  caught.	  Given	  the	  individual	  is	  caught,	  the	  game	  moves	  to	  the	  Stage	  2.	  In	  this	  stage,	  the	   police	   should	   process	   the	   case	   and	   then	   refer	   the	   case	   to	   district	   prosecutors.	   Prior	   to	  processing	  of	   the	  case,	   the	  offender	  may	  offer	  a	  bribe	  to	  the	  police	  or	  alternatively	  a	  corrupt	  policeman	  may	  extort	  money	  from	  the	  defendant.	  At	  this	  stage,	  both	  parties	  may	  involve	  in	  a	  bargaining	   process.	   Stage	   2	   modelled	   corruption	   by	   police	   officers.	   Bowles	   and	   Garoupa	  (2005)	  provided	  extensive	  and	  excellent	  analysis	  of	  modelling	  police	  corruption.	  	  There	  are	  various	  possible	  outcomes	  from	  the	  bargaining.	  If	  the	  bargaining	  is	  agreed,	  there	  is	  an	   opportunity	   that	   the	   policeman	   stop	   the	   process	   of	   investigation	   and	   decide	   for	   not	   to	  record	  the	  case.	  	  Another	  alternative	  outcome	  if	  the	  bargaining	  is	  agreed	  is	  that	  the	  police	  may	  continue	   to	   process	   the	   case	   and	   refer	   the	   case	   to	   prosecutors	   but	   with	   lower	   gravity	   of	  offending	   and	   weaker	   evidence.	   This	   case	   may	   occur	   when	   the	   case	   is	   considered	   as	   high	  profile	   whereby	   the	   press	   has	   reported	   in	   the	   media.	   Nevertheless,	   if	   the	   policeman	   is	   a	  righteous	   person,	   any	   attempt	   to	   offer	   a	   bribe	   by	   the	   offenders	  may	   adversely	   affect	   to	   the	  offenders.	   In	  the	  referral	   to	  the	  prosecutors,	   the	  policeman	  may	  include	   information	  that	  the	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offenders	  attempted	  to	  offer	  a	  bribe	  to	  him/her.	   If	   this	  scenario	  occurs,	   the	  offenders	  will	  be	  prosecuted	  more	  severely	  as	  they	  are	  going	  to	  be	  prosecuted	  with	  harder	  punishments.	  	  Stage	   3	   provides	   a	  model	   of	   corruption	   involving	   prosecutors	   and	   judges.	   At	   this	   stage,	   the	  defendants	  may	  offer	  a	  bribe	   to	  prosecutors	  and	  or	   judges.	  Alternatively,	   the	  prosecutors	  or	  judges	  may	  extort	  money	   from	  defendants.	  The	   fact	   that	   Indonesia	   follows	   civil	   law	  provide	  plenty	  room	  of	  manoeuvre	  for	  prosecutors	  and	  judges	  to	  extort	  money	  from	  defendants.	  There	  are	  various	  acts	   in	  Indonesia,	  and	  since	  Indonesia	  follow	  civil	   law,	   it	   is	  compulsory	  that	  each	  act	  states	  clearly	  the	  intensity	  of	  punishment	  to	  those	  who	  violate	  the	  law.	  In	  the	  banking	  act	  in	  2004	  for	  instance,	  the	  maximum	  fines	  for	  offenders	  worth	  Rp100	  billion	  rupiah.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	   anti	   corruption	   act	   stated	   that	   the	  maximum	   fines	  worth	   only	   Rp1	   billion	   rupiah.	  Obviously	  the	  different	  in	  the	  intensity	  of	  punishment	  between	  some	  acts	  create	  opportunity	  to	  prosecutors	  and	  judges	  to	  extort	  money	  from	  defendants	  in	  exchange	  to	  charges	  with	  less	  intensive	  punishments.	  	  	  Similar	   to	   the	   process	   at	   stage	   2,	   there	   is	   a	   bargaining	   process	   in	   stage	   3	   to	   determine	   the	  amount	  of	  money	  bribed	  or	  extorted	  and	  the	  possible	  outcomes	  in	  the	  court.	  If	  the	  bargaining	  is	  agreed,	  the	  defendant	  may	  be	  charged	  with	  not	  guilty	  or	  even	  if	  the	  defendant	  is	  found	  guilty	  he/she	   may	   receive	   much	   less	   intensive	   punishment.	   	   Nevertheless,	   bribing	   is	   uncertain	  business	  as	  the	  defendant	  may	  not	  know	  the	  types	  of	  prosecutors	  or	  judges.	  If	  the	  prosecutors	  and	   the	   judges	   are	   righteous	   individuals,	   then	   offering	   bribe	   to	   them	   may	   result	   in	   more	  intensive	  punishment	  for	  the	  defendants.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  corruption	  in	  courts	  in	  Indonesia	  are	  not	  limited	  only	  at	  district	  courts,	  but	   it	  may	   occur	   in	   high	   courts	   and	   even	   in	   the	   supreme	   courts.	   There	   are	   several	   cases	   of	  corruption	  involving	  supreme	  judges	  in	  the	  supreme	  courts.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  also	  that	  under	  Indonesia’s	  penal	   law	  system,	  the	  decision	  whether	  defendants	  are	  guilty	  or	  not	  and	  also	  the	  intensity	   of	   punishment	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   judges.	   There	   is	   no	   jury	   in	   Indonesia	   judicial	  system.	   Consequently,	   the	   desire	   to	   offer	   a	   bribe	   to	   judges	   is	   paramount	   as	   the	   judges	   have	  tremendous	  right	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  defendants	  are	  guilty	  or	  not	  and	  they	  also	  hold	  the	  right	  to	  determine	  the	  type	  and	  the	  intensity	  of	  punishment.	  	  In	  the	  final	  stage,	  corruption	  may	  be	  committed	  by	  officers	  in	  prisons.	  	  The	  type	  of	  corruption	  committed	   in	   prison	   ranging	   from	   asking	   money	   to	   the	   family	   of	   offenders	   during	   the	  scheduled	  visits	  up	   to	   allowing	  offenders	   to	   spend	   several	  nights	   to	   stay	  at	  home	  with	   their	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family.	  There	   are	   two	   famous	   cases	  of	   corruption	   in	  prison	   in	   Indonesia.	   First	   is	   the	   case	  of	  Artalita	   who	  managed	   to	   bribe	   prison	   officers	   to	   allow	   her	   to	   have	   her	   own	   five	   star	   very	  spacious	  private	  room	  within	  the	  prison	  area.	  Furthermore,	  he	  has	  another	  spacious	  room	  for	  organising	  monthly	  meeting	  with	  her	  staff	  to	  run	  her	  multi	  billion	  businesses.	  Secondly	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Gayus	  Tambunan,	  who	  managed	  to	  bribe	  prison	  officers	  to	  allow	  him	  to	  go	  on	  holiday	  in	  Hongkong	  with	  his	  wife	  and	  to	  watch	  international	  tennis	  match	  in	  Bali.	  	  The	   complexity	   of	   corruption	   in	   Indonesia	   is	   paramount	   if	   consideration	   is	   taken	   for	   the	  existence	   of	   markus	   	   or	   case	   broker	   in	   every	   single	   level	   of	   criminal	   justice	   authority	   in	  Indonesia.	  Markus	  is	  stand	  for	  makelar	  kasus	  (makelar	  is	  from	  the	  Dutch	  word	  makelaar	  which	  mean	  broker,	  and	  kasus	  means	  case,	  thus	  markus	  is	  a	  case	  broker).	  The	  markuses	  exist	  in	  every	  single	   part	   of	   criminal	   justice	   authority	   in	   Indonesia.	   The	  markus	   may	   not	   necessarily	   be	   a	  criminal	  justice	  officer,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  anybody	  as	  long	  as	  the	  person	  has	  a	  good	  connection	  with	  officers	  in	  criminal	  justice	  system.	  As	  a	  broker,	  the	  markus	  works	  by	  intermediating	  between	  defendants	  and	  officers	  in	  criminal	  justice	  system.	  Indeed,	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  markus	  occurs	  due	  to	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  bribery	  and	  extortion	  whether	  the	  offer	  would	  be	  accepted	  the	  other	  party.	  The	  markus	  serves	  as	  the	  intermediary	  between	  both	  parties	  to	  smooth	  the	  process	  and	  to	  reduce	  error	   types	   I	  and	   II	   in	  offering	  bribery	  or	  asking	   for	  extortion.	  The	  problem	  of	   the	  
markus	  is	  paramount	  such	  that	  the	  GoI	  has	  formed	  a	  special	  task	  force	  for	  cracking	  the	  Markus	  within	  the	  criminal	  justice	  authority.	  	  
3.	  Judicial	  System	  in	  Indonesia	  Under	   Indonesia	   criminal	   justice	   system,	   all	   criminal	   cases	   should	  be	   trialled	  before	  District	  courts.	  Each	  District	  court	   is	  situated	   in	  a	  Kabupaten	  (district)	  and	  there	  are	  502	  districts	   in	  Indonesia.	   Judges’	   decisions	   in	   a	   district	   court	   may	   be	   appealed	   either	   by	   defendants	   or	  prosecutors	   if	   they	   dissatisfied	  with	   the	   decisions.	   In	   the	   event	   that	   the	   defendant	   does	   the	  appeal,	   which	   occurs	   in	   most	   corruption	   cases,	   then	   the	   case	   is	   referred	   to	   the	   high	   court,	  which	  situated	   in	   the	  capital	  of	  each	  province.	   	   In	   the	  case	   for	  which	  the	  defendant	  does	  not	  satisfy	  with	  judges’	  decisions	  in	  the	  High	  court,	  a	  further	  appeal	  can	  be	  made	  to	  the	  supreme	  court.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  if	  the	  prosecutor	  does	  not	  satisfy	  with	  judges’	  decisions	  in	  the	  District	  court,	  the	  case	  may	  be	  appeald	  directly	  to	  the	  supreme	  court.	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Figure	  1:	  Appeal	  Process	  in	  Indonesia	  Criminal	  Justice	  System	  After	  the	  case	  was	  sentenced	  by	  the	  supreme	  court,	  there	  is	  still	  an	  opportunity	  for	  conducting	  further	   appeal	   called	   a	   judicial	   re-­‐examination	   by	   the	   supreme	   court.	   The	   judicial	   re-­‐examination	  can	  only	  be	  pursued	  if	  there	  is	  new	  evidence,	  which	  has	  not	  been	  put	  before	  trial	  previously.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   the	   cost	   of	   court	   in	   Indonesia	   is	   economical.	  The	   judicial	  system	   in	   Indonesia	   rules	   that	   the	   there	  are	   three	  possible	  values	  of	   the	  court	  costs,	  namely	  Rp2500	  to	  Rp10,000	  (US$0.29	  –	  1.16),	  irrespective	  of	  how	  long	  the	  trials	  have	  been	  conducted.	  	  Owing	  to	  the	  structure	  above,	  it	  is	  highly	  likely	  that	  a	  defendant	  make	  an	  appeal	  until	  reaching	  the	   supreme	   court.	   Almost	   all	   corruption	   cases	   that	   have	   been	  dealt	   by	   district	   courts	  were	  appealed	  up	  until	  to	  the	  Supreme	  court.	  This	  occurs	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  defendants	  who	   were	   prosecuted	   for	   corruption	   cases	   tend	   to	   be	   more	   educated	   in	   comparison	   to	  defendants	   for	  other	   conventional	  offences	   (e.g.	   theft,	   robbery,	   criminal	  damage,	   etc)4.	   From	  game	  theoretical	  analysis,	   it	   is	  rational	   for	  defendants	  to	  appeal	   their	  case	  until	   the	  supreme	  court	   as	   the	   system	   allows	   of	   doing	   so	   and	   the	   court	   cost,	   apart	   from	   hiring	   lawyer,	   is	  economical.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Eddy	  Hiarej	  for	  providing	  expert	  opinion	  regarding	  this	  point.	  	  















	  Figure	  2:	  Comparison	  of	  the	  Distribution	  of	  Cases	  Across	  Level	  of	  Courts	  The	  cases	  appealed	  in	  Indonesia	  judicial	  system	  looks	  like	  a	  tube	  or	  a	  pipe,	  whereby	  there	  is	  no	  different	  between	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  dealth	  by	  the	  district	  courts	  and	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  dealth	  by	  the	  supreme	  court.	  This	  occurs	  since	  almost	  all	  corruption	  cases	  which	  were	  trialed	  in	  the	  district	  court	  have	  been	  appealed.	  Once	  an	  appeal	  has	  been	  made	  by	  either	  a	  defendant	  or	   a	   prosecutor,	   then	   the	   case	   is	   certaintly	   end	   up	   in	   the	   supreme	   court.	   Obviously	   this	  structure	   is	   different	   from	   the	   distribution	   of	   cases	   dealth	   by	   different	   level	   of	   courts	   in	  countries	  which	  follow	  common	  law.	  In	  those	  countries,	  some	  cases	  in	  either	  magistrate	  court	  or	   crown	  court	  may	  not	  be	  able	   to	  be	  appealed	   in	  high	  courts.	   Similarly,	   some	  cases	   in	  high	  courts	  may	   not	   necessarily	   be	   able	   to	   be	   appealed	   in	   the	   supreme	   courts.	   Consequently	   the	  structure	   of	   the	   distribution	   of	   cases	   in	   each	   level	   of	   court	   in	   those	   countries	   looks	   like	   a	  triangle.	  	  	  	  The	  data	  used	  in	  this	  study	  were	  based	  on	  the	  Supreme	  court’s	  decisions	  in	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2009.	  Indeed	  the	  use	  of	  decisions	  by	  the	  supreme	  courts	  create	  unobserved	  heterogeneity	  and	  the	  source	  of	  the	  unobserved	  heterogeneity	  are	  as	  follows:	  1. Some	   appeals	   went	   through	   high	   courts,	   but	   some	   went	   directly	   to	   the	   supreme	   court	  (being	  accommodated	  in	  the	  model);	  2. The	  number	  of	  cases	  terminated	  in	  high	  courts	  is	  unknown	  (unsolved);	  3. The	  number	  of	  cases	  terminated	  in	  district	  courts	  is	  unknown	  (unsolved);	  4. The	  number	  of	  cases	  reported	  to	  Police	  is	  unknown	  (unsolved).	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Supreme	  court	   24,826	   10,714	   43.16%	   46	   540	   233	  
High	  court	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
a.	  Common	  Court	   8,202	   6,352	   77.44%	   334	   25	   19	  
b.	  Religious	  Court	   1,952	   1,592	   81.56%	   239	   8	   7	  
c.	  State	  Administration	  
Court	   621	   523	   84.22%	   30	   21	   17	  
d.	  Military	  Court	   425	   303	   71.29%	   9	   47	   34	  
District	  court	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
a.	  Common	  Court	   2,636,689	   2,601,551	   98.67%	   2,787	   946	   933	  
b.	  Religious	  Court	   206,780	   171,573	   82.97%	   2,203	   94	   78	  
c.	  State	  Administration	  
Court	   1,203	   840	   69.83%	   180	   7	   5	  
d.	  Military	  Court	   4,628	   3,838	   82.93%	   73	   63	   53	  
Source:	  The	  Supreme	  court	  Annual	  Report	  2006.	  Table	   1	   shows	   the	   extend	   of	   the	   burden	   faced	   by	   judges	   across	   various	   level	   of	   courts	   in	  Indonesia.	  The	  number	  of	  cases	  appealed	  to	  the	  supreme	  court	  is	  higher	  than	  those	  of	  the	  high	  courts.	  The	  ratio	  of	  the	  cases	  appealed	  to	  the	  supreme	  court	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  high	  courts	  is	  about	  3	   to	  1.	  Unfortunately	  only	  46	   judges	   in	   the	  supreme	  court	   in	   Indonesia,	  as	  opposed	  to	  334	  judges	  in	  the	   	  high	  courts,	  therefore	  it	   is	  not	  suprising	  that	  the	  average	  case	  per	  judge	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Eddy	  OS	  Hiarej	  and	  Hifdzil	  Alim	  for	  suggesting	  this	  point.	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much	  higher	  in	  the	  supreme	  court	  (540	  cases)	  relative	  to	  that	  of	  the	  high	  court	  (25	  cases).	  The	  judges	  in	  the	  high	  court	  managed	  to	  complete	  77.44%	  of	  cases	  appealed,	  whereas	  the	  supreme	  court	   judges	   only	   managed	   to	   complete	   43.16%	   of	   cases	   appealed	   to	   the	   supreme	   court.	  Obviously	  this	  creates	  the	  backlock	  of	  the	  cases	  tackled	  	  by	  the	  supreme	  court	  and	  should	  be	  dealt	  in	  the	  following	  year.	  
The	  Cost	  of	  Corruption	  Each	  criminal	  offence	  creates	  burdens	  or	  social	  costs	  to	  the	  society.	  	  There	  are	  various	  ways	  to	  estimate	   the	   social	   costs	   of	   crime	   (see	   Brand	   and	   Price,	   2000,	   Dubourg	   et	   al,	   2005,	   among	  others).	   Brand	   and	   Price	   (2000)	   proposed	   the	   social	   costs	   of	   crime	   consist	   of	   three	   main	  elements,	  which	   are	   the	   costs	   in	   anticipation	   of	   crime,	   the	   costs	   inflicted	   to	   victims	   and	   the	  costs	  in	  reaction	  of	  crime.	  Corruption	  is	  an	  extra	  ordinary	  crime,	  however,	  corruption	  may	  not	  necessarily	   affect	   to	   particular	   victims.	   To	   some	   extend,	   corruption	  may	   be	   considered	   as	   a	  victimless	   crime	   if	  we	   compare	   it	  with	  other	   types	  of	   offences,	  which	   involve	   some	  physical	  impacts	  to	  victims	  such	  as	  robbery,	  the	  violence	  against	  the	  person,	  sexual	  offences,	  etc.	  	  	  Corruption	  creates	  misallocation	  of	  resources	  and	  to	  some	  extend	  they	  may	  reduce	  the	  welfare	  of	  many	  individuals	  in	  the	  society.	  Using	  a	  similar	  framework	  as	  proposed	  by	  Brand	  and	  Price’s	  (2000),	  the	  social	  cost	  of	  corruption	  may	  be	  estimated	  using	  four	  elements	  as	  follows:	  1. the	  costs	  in	  anticipation	  of	  corruption,	  2. the	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption,	  	  3. the	  implicit	  costs	  of	  corruption,	  4. the	  costs	  in	  reaction	  to	  corruption.	  	  In	  measuring	  the	  misallocation	  of	  resources	  owing	  to	  corruption,	  the	  explicit	  and	  the	  implicit	  costs	  of	  corruption	  may	  not	  be	  separated.	  The	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption	  measures	  the	  amount	  of	  public	  money	  that	  was	  misallocated	  to	  personal	  purpose.	   	  The	   implicit	  costs	  of	  corruption	  measure	   the	   opportunity	   costs	   of	   misallocating	   the	   resources,	   namely	   the	   loss	   in	   economic	  multiplier	  due	  to	  the	  misallocation	  of	  public	  money	  to	  personal	  purpose.	  	  According	   to	   the	   anti	   corruption	   act,	   any	   conduct	   by	   individual	   or	   corporation	  which	   either	  against	   the	   law	   and	   or	   abuse	   the	   power	  which	  may	   inflicted	   losses	   to	   economy	   or	   national	  budget	  is	  considered	  as	  a	  corruption.	  The	  definition	  of	  corruption	  in	  the	  anti	  corruption	  act	  is	  limited	   to	  misallocation	   of	   public	  money.	   Indeed,	   the	   coverage	   of	   offences	   in	   Indonesia	   anti	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corruption	  act	   is	  narrower	   in	  comparison	  to	   that	  of	   the	  UN	  convention	  against	  corruption	   in	  2003,	  whereby	  Indonesia	  is	  one	  of	  countries,	  which	  ratified	  it.	  	  The	  anti	  corruption	  act	  does	  not	  cover	  corruption	  by	  private	  sector,	  moreover	  it	  does	  not	  taken	  into	  consideration	  that	  money	  politic	  is	  part	  of	  corruption.	  The	  latter	  is	  quite	  ironic	  since	  in	  Indonesia	  Criminal	  Code	  (KUHP)	  it	   is	   stated	  clearly	   that	  money	  politic	   is	  a	  criminal	  offence,	  unfortunately	   this	   type	  of	  offence	  has	  not	  been	  acknowledge	  as	  part	  of	  corruption	  in	  the	  anti	  corruption	  act.	  	  The	  main	  indicator	  of	  corruption	  in	  Indonesia	  is	  that	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  activity	  may	  inflict	  losses	   to	   economy	   or	   the	   national	   budget.	   Ideally	   the	   estimation	   of	   losses	   in	   economy	   and	  national	  budget	  uses	  Economics	  approach	  by	  estimating	  both	  the	  explicit	  and	  the	  implicit	  costs	  of	   corruption.	   The	   common	   practice	   in	   Indonesia	   judicial	   system	   is	   that	   the	   estimation	   of	  losses	   in	   economy	   or	   national	   budget	   due	   to	   corruption	   is	   limited	   to	   the	   explicit	   cost	   of	  corruption.	   The	   estimation	   of	   the	   losses	   has	   been	   conducted	   by	   prosecutors,	  who	   obviously	  well	   versed	   in	   the	   area	   of	   law	   but	   they	   have	   limited	   knowledge	   in	   Economics.	   From	   the	  perspective	  of	  Economics,	  the	  use	  of	  explicit	  costs	  as	  a	  measure	  to	  prosecute	  an	  individual	  for	  committing	   a	   corruption	   contains	   high	   probability	   of	   making	   error	   types	   I	   and	   II	   in	   court	  sentences.	  	  The	  estimation	  of	  explicit	  and	  implicit	  costs	  cannot	  be	  separated	  in	  every	  economic	  activity.	  In	  many	  cases,	   the	  explicit	   costs	  of	  a	  decision	  are	  overwhelmed	  by	   its	   implicit	   costs	  or	   implicit	  benefits.	   For	   instance,	   in	   order	   to	   compensate	   an	   increase	   in	   fuel	   prices,	   the	   Indonesian	  government	  provides	  transfer	  payment	  to	  households	  with	  low	  income	  for	  the	  first	  six	  months.	  If	  the	  explicit	  costs	  are	  the	  only	  measure	  used	  to	  analyse	  the	  initiative,	  than	  there	  is	  no	  merits	  of	  this	  initiative	  as	  it	  costs	  dearly	  to	  the	  taxpayers.	  Nevertheless,	  if	  the	  opportunity	  costs	  have	  been	   taken	   into	  consideration,	   then	   the	  benefits	  of	   the	   initiative	  may	  dominate	   it	  cost	  as	   the	  economic	  multiplier	  would	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  analysing	  the	  initiative.	  	  Brand	  and	  Price	  (2000)	  estimated	  the	  social	  cost	  of	  crime	  by	  taken	  into	  consideration	  offence	  multiplier	   for	   each	   offence.	   It	   is	   true	   that	   for	   almost	   all	   offences,	   the	   underlying	   number	   of	  offences	  is	  unknown.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  recorded	  offences	  reported	  by	  Police	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  tip	  of	  an	  iceberg,	  as	  the	  number	  of	  unrecorded	  offences	   is	  unknown.	  The	  number	  of	  unrecorded	  offences	  can	  be	  estimated	  by	  estimating	  the	  value	  of	  offence	  multiplier.	  The	  offence	  multiplier	  is	  estimated	  by	  comparing	  the	  number	  of	  subjects	  in	  a	  particular	  survey	  who	  were	  victimised	  and	   they	   report	   to	   the	   police	   and	   those	  who	   did	   not	   report.	   This	  multiplier	   can	   be	   used	   to	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estimate	  the	  number	  of	  unrecorded	  offences.	  The	  underlying	  number	  of	  offences,	  then,	   is	  the	  summation	   of	   the	   number	   of	   recorded	   offences	   and	   the	   estimated	   number	   of	   unrecorded	  offences.	  	  Thus	   far	   there	   is	   no	   comprehensive	   survey	   on	   crime	   and	   victimisation	   in	   Indonesia,	  consequently	   the	  offence	  multiplier	  on	  corruption	  cannot	  be	  estimated.	  Owing	   to	   the	   lack	  of	  the	  information,	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  corruption	  does	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  number	  of	  unrecorded	  offences	  as	  used	   in	  Brand	  and	  Price	  (2000).	   It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	   the	  social	   cost	   of	   corruption	   in	   this	   paper	   is	   underestimated,	   as	   it	   does	   not	   taken	   into	  consideration	   the	   offence	   multiplier	   and	   also	   the	   opportunity	   costs	   of	   misallocation	   of	  resources	  due	  to	  corruption.	  	  The	  estimation	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  corruption	  in	  this	  chapter	  refers	  to	  the	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption	  as	  estimated	  by	  prosecutors	  and	  stated	  explicitly	  in	  the	  documents	  of	  Indonesia	  Supreme	  court	  decisions.	  Based	  on	  constant	  price	  2008,	  the	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption	  in	  Indonesia	  from	  2001	  to	  2009	  was	  Rp	  73.10	  trillion	  (US$	  8.49	  billion	  based	  on	  average	  exchange	  rate	  in	  August	  2011	  which	  is	  Rp8600:	  US$1).	  This	  is	  slightly	  higher	  then	  the	  value	  of	  fiscal	  expansion	  (Rp72	  trillion	  or	   $8.37	   billion)	   allocated	   by	   the	   Indonesian	   government	   in	   order	   to	   reduce	   the	   impact	   of	  global	   crisis	   in	   2009.	   The	   cost	   of	   corruption	   in	   the	   period	   of	   2001-­‐2009	  was	   about	   7.3%	  of	  Indonesian	  annual	  budget	  in	  2009	  or	  about	  6.08%	  of	  the	  annual	  budget	  in	  2011.	  	  Table	  2	  shows	  that	  most	  corruptions	  in	  Indonesia	  have	  been	  committed	  by	  male	  (93%).	  This	  occurs	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  most	   important	   positions	   in	   public	   sector	   are	   still	   dominated	   by	  male.	  Of	  544	  offenders	  who	  were	   found	  guilty	  by	  the	  supreme	  court,	  only	  36	   individuals	  are	  female	  (6.67%).	  The	  proportion	  of	  money	  that	  female	  corruptors	  took	  only	  0.03%	  as	  opposed	  to	  99.92%	  which	  was	  corrupted	  by	  their	  male	  counterparts.	  	  In	  term	  of	  age,	  the	  majority	  of	  corruptions	  were	  committed	  by	  individuals	  in	  their	  productive	  age	  (below	  60	  year	  old).	  Of	  544	  corruptors,	  479	  individuals	  (88.70%)	  were	  below	  60	  year	  old,	  while	  only	  60	  corruptors	  (11.11%)	  were	  60	  year	  old	  or	  older.	  This	  feature	  is	  different	  from	  the	  characteristics	   of	   offenders	   for	   conventional	   crimes,	   such	   as	   burglary,	   theft,	   robbery,	   etc.	  Bowles	   and	  Pradiptyo	   (2005)	  used	  British	  Offender	   Index	  data	   and	   found	   that	  offenders	   for	  conventional	  crime	  are	  aged	  sensitive.	  They	  may	  started	  to	  have	  a	  criminal	  carrier	  as	  early	  as	  8	  or	  9	   years	  old,	   however	   they	   tend	   to	   stop	  offending	  when	   they	   reach	  age	  of	  40.	   In	   contrast,	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when	   individuals	   reached	   the	   age	   of	   40	   year	   old,	   this	   is	   considered	   as	   the	   beginning	   for	  individual	  to	  have	  carrier	  as	  a	  corruptor	  since	  they	  started	  to	  have	  a	  good	  position	  at	  that	  age.	  	  Table	  2:	  The	  Explicit	  Social	  Costs	  of	  Corruption	  in	  Indonesia	  2001-­‐2008	  Based	  on	  Gender,	  Location	  and	  Occupation	  
	  	  
	  	   	  	   Explicit	  Costs	  of	  Corruption	  (2008	  Price)	  	  	  Number	  of	  Offenders	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  %	   Total	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  %	   Average	  
Gender	  
Male	   504	   93.33%	   Rp	  73.05	  trillion	  	   99.92%	   Rp144.93	  billion	  	  (US$8.49	  billion)	  	   (US$	  16.85	  million)	  Female	   36	   6.67%	   Rp19.98	  billion	   0.03%	   Rp555.22	  million	  (US$2.32	  million)	   (US$	  64,560)	  NA	   4	   	  	   Rp35.00	  billion	   0.05%	   Rp8.75	  billion	  (US$4.07	  million)	   (US$1.02	  million)	  
Age	  
Below	  60	  	   479	   88.70%	   Rp38.72	  trillion	   52.97%	   Rp80.84	  billion	  (US$4.50	  billion)	   (US$9.40	  million)	  60+	   60	   11.11%	   Rp34.34	  trillion	   46.98%	   Rp572.37	  billion	  	  (US$3.99	  billion)	   (US$66.55	  million)	  NA	   5	   0.93%	   Rp35.00	  billion	   0.05%	   Rp8.75	  billion	  (US$4.07	  million)	   (US$1.02	  million)	  
Location	  
Jawa	   241	   44.63%	   Rp37.36	  trilion	   51.11%	   Rp155.03	  billion	  (US$4.34	  billion)	   (US$	  18.03	  million)	  	  	  	  	  	  Greater	  Jakarta	  (Jabodetabek)*	   78	   32.37%	   Rp36.86	  Trilion	  	   98.67%	   Rp472.64	  billion	  (US$4.15	  billion)	   (US$54.96	  million)	  Outside	  Jawa	   299	   55.37%	   Rp35.70	  trilion	   48.89%	   Rp119.41	  billion	  	  (US$4.15	  billion)	   (US$13.89	  million)	  NA	   4	   	  	   Rp35.00	  billion	   0.05%	   Rp8.75	  billion	  (US$4.07	  million)	   (US$1.02	  million)	  
Occupation	  
Civil	  Servant	   223	   41.30%	   Rp470.15	  billion	  	   0.64%	   Rp2.11	  billion	  (US$	  54.67	  million	   (US$245,226)	  State-­‐owned	  Enterprise	  Employee	   68	   12.59%	   Rp29.33	  trilion	  	   40.12%	   Rp431.31	  billion	  	  (US$3.41	  billion)	   (US$50,152)	  Legislative	   130	   24.07%	   Rp216.65	  billion	  	   0.30%	   Rp1.66	  billion	  	  (US$25.19	  million)	   (US$193,837)	  Private	  Sector	   117	   21.67%	   Rp37.75	  trilion	  	   51.64%	   Rp322.63	  billion	  (US$4.39	  billion)	   (US$37.51	  million)	  NA	   6	   1.11%	   Rp5.34	  trilion	   7.30%	   Rp889.33	  billion	  (US$620.47	  billion)	   (US$103,41	  million)	  Total	   	  	   544	   	  	   Rp73.10	  trillion	   100.00%	   Rp135.370	  billion	  (US$8.50	  billion)	   (US$15.741	  million)	  
Source:	  Indonesia	  Supreme	  Court	  Decisions,	  2001-­‐2009.	  The	   proportion	   of	   senior	   corruptors	   was	   just	   11.11%,	   however	   the	   total	   explicit	   cost	   they	  inflicted	  to	  Indonesia	  economy	  was	  Rp34.34	  trillion	  (US$3.99	  billion)	  or	  about	  46.98%	  of	  the	  total	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption.	   Since	   the	   senior	   corruptors	   were	   only	   60	   individuals,	   the	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average	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption	  inflicted	  by	  senior	  offenders	  (aged	  60	  year	  old	  or	  above)	  is	  more	  then	  seven	  folds	  to	  that	  of	  committed	  by	  offenders	  at	  productive	  aged.	  	  In	   term	   of	   geographical	   distribution,	   of	   544	   offenders,	   241	   offenders	   (44.63%)	   committed	  corruption	   in	   the	   island	   of	   Jawa.	   The	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption	   in	   Jawa	  was	   accounted	   for	  Rp37.36	   trillion	   (US$4.34	   billion),	   of	  which	  Rp	  Rp36.86	   trillion	   (US$4.15	   billion)	   or	   98.67%	  occurred	   in	   Greater	   Jakarta	   (Jabodetabek,	   stand	   for	   Jakarta-­‐Bogor-­‐Depok-­‐Tangerang	   and	  Bekasi).	   The	   average	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption	   in	   Jakarta	   was	   Rp472.64	   billion	   (US$54.96	  million)	  or	  more	   than	   three	   folds	   to	   that	  of	   corruption	   in	   Jawa	  or	  about	   four	   folds	   to	   that	  of	  corruption	  in	  outside	  Jawa.	  	  The	   highest	   proportion	   of	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption	   was	   attributable	   by	   offenders	   from	  private	   sectors	   51.64%	   or	   about	   Rp37.75	   trillion	   (US$4.39	   billion).	   Indeed	   the	   definition	   of	  corruption	  in	  Indonesia	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  misallocation	  of	  public	  money.	  The	  involvement	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  corruption	  in	  Indonesia	  is	  primarily	  related	  to	  provision	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  in	  public	  sector.	  The	  highest	  average	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption,	  however,	  was	  attributable	  by	  state-­‐own	   enterprise	   employees.	   It	   is	   recoded	   that	   only	   68	   state-­‐own	   enterprise	   employees	  who	   were	   found	   guilty	   of	   committing	   corruption,	   however	   the	   average	   explicit	   cost	   of	  corruption	  they	   inflicted	  to	  economy	  was	  Rp431.31	  billion	  (US$50.15	  million).	  Most	  cases	  of	  corruption	  involving	  State-­‐owned	  (and	  also	  local-­‐government	  owned)	  enterprises’	  employees	  are	  related	  to	  procurement,	  embezzlement	  and	  their	  conducts	  during	  and	  post	  economic	  crisis	  in	  1998,	  which	  were	  considered	  against	  the	  national	  interests.	  Civil	  servants	  involved	  in	  more	  than	  a	  half	  of	  corruption	  cases	  in	  Indonesia,	  whereas	  members	  of	  the	  parliament	  (both	  in	  local	  and	  national	  levels)	  involved	  in	  almost	  a	  quarter	  of	  corruption	  cases	   in	   Indonesia.	   In	   contrast	   to	   State-­‐owned	   companies	   employee,	   the	   average	   value	   of	  corruption	   of	   civil	   servants	   and	   senators	   were	   only	   Rp2.11	   billion	   ($245,226)	   and	   Rp1.66	  billion	  ($193,837),	  respectively.	  	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  estimation	  of	  social	  costs	  using	  explicit	  costs	  implies	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	   social	   costs	   of	   corruption	   has	   been	   underestimated.	   Given	   that	   the	   explicit	   cost	   of	  corruption	   in	   Indonesia	   is	   relatively	   high,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   attempt	   to	   recover	   the	  misallocation	  of	  resources,	  obviously	  the	  cost	  of	  corruption	  would	  be	  bourne	  by	  the	  taxpayers.	  Unfortunately	   little	  attempt	  has	  been	  made	  by	  Indonesia’s	  criminal	   justice	  system	  to	  recover	  the	  misallocation	  of	  resources	  created	  by	  corruptors.	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It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  are	  various	  types	  of	  financial	  punishments	  in	  Indonesia’s	  justice	  system,	  namely:	   fines,	  compensation,	  and	  seizure	  of	  evidence	  (monetary	  and	  non	  monetary),	  court	   costs	   and	   other	   sentence.	   We	   defined	   total	   financial	   punishment	   which	   comprises	   of	  fines,	   compensation	   order	   and	   the	   monetary	   seizure	   of	   asset	   or	   evidence.	   Non	   monetary	  seizure	   of	   asset	   or	   evidence	   is	   not	   included	   in	   the	   variable	   as	   we	   face	   with	   complexity	   of	  converting	   it	   to	  monetary	  value.	  The	  court	  cost	   is	  negligible	  as	   its	  values	  ranges	  between	  Rp	  2500	  to	  Rp	  10,000	  ($0.29	  to	  $1.16),	  and	  other	  sentence	  is	  also	  negligible.	  












Explicit Cost of 
Corruption* 544	   Rp73.10	  trillion	   100%	   Rp135.37	  billion	  (US$8.50	  billion)	   (US$15.74	  million)	  
Financial 
Punishment 




Judges in District 
courts** 468	  




Judges in the 
Supreme court ** 544	  
Rp5.33	  trillion	   7.29%	   Rp9.80	  billion	  ($	  619.77	  million)	   ($	  1.14	  million)	  	  
Source:	  Supreme	  court	  Decisions	  2001-­‐2009,	  estimated.	  	  
Table	   3	   shows	   the	   discrepancy	   between	   the	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption	   and	   the	   total	   financial	  
punishment	  sentenced	  by	  judges	  in	  Indonesia’s	  judicial	  system.	  Prior	  to	  the	  trial	  in	  a	  district	  court,	  
prosecutors	   estimated	   the	   value	   of	   the	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption.	   In	   the	   trial,	   then,	   the	  
prosecutions	  to	  offenders	  were	  made	  by	  the	  prosecutors.	  The	  value	  of	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption	  
during	   2001-­‐2009	   was	   Rp73.10	   trillion	   (US$	   8.49	   billion),	   however,	   surprisingly	   the	   defendants	  
were	   prosecuted	   only	   Rp32.40	   trillion	   (US$	   3.77	   billion)	   or	   59.37%	   of	   the	   total	   explicit	   cost	   of	  
corruption.	  	  	  	  
In	   essence,	   this	   phenomenon	   can	  be	   analysed	   as	   a	   bargaining	  problem.	   If	   the	  bargaining	   can	  be	  
described	  as	  a	  modelling	  of	  splitting	  a	  pie,	   than	  the	  underlying	  size	  of	   the	  pie	   is	   the	  total	  explicit	  
cost	  of	  corruption.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  data	  show	  that	  most	  district	  prosecutors	  did	  not	  realise	  that	  
the	  underlying	  value	  of	  the	  pie	  is	  the	  explicit	  social	  costs	  of	  crime,	  which	  are	  Rp73.10	  trillion	  ($8.50	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billion)	   in	   total	   or	   Rp135.37	   billion	   ($15.74	   million)	   in	   average	   value.	   	   Instead	   of	   prosecuting	  
defendants	  according	  to	  the	  explicit	  costs	  of	  corruption,	  they	  tend	  to	  prosecute	  only	  about	  60%	  of	  
the	   total	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption.	   Unfortunately,	   there	   is	   no	   further	   information	   on	   how	   this	  
mechanism	  had	  been	  done	  by	  the	  prosecutors.	  	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  economists,	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  puzzling,	  if	  it	  cannot	  be	  said	  as	  irrational.	  
As	   bargaining	   problem	   is	   a	   problem	   of	   ‘splitting	   a	   pie’,	   then	   it	   would	   be	   rational	   to	   prosecute	  
defendant	   with	   at	   least	   equal	   to	   the	   values	   of	   the	   explicit	   costs	   of	   corruption	   in	   order	   to	  
incorporate	   the	   opportunity	   costs	   of	   the	   misallocation	   of	   resources.	   This	   notion	   is	   based	   on	  
assumption	  that	   there	  would	  be	  some	  kind	  of	   ‘negotiation’processes	  during	  the	  trials	  and	   judges	  
may	  not	  necessarily	  fulfil	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  financial	  punishment	  prosecuted.	  This	  process	  can	  be	  
analysed	   by	   comparing	   the	   value	   of	   total	   financial	   punishment	   prosecuted	   and	   total	   financial	  
punishment	  sentenced	  by	  judges	  in	  the	  District	  courts.	  
In	   the	   high	   courts,	   of	   544	   defendants	   who	   were	   found	   guilty	   by	   the	   district	   courts,	   only	   468	  
defendants	   (86.03%)	   were	   also	   found	   guilty	   by	   the	   high	   courts.	   The	   total	   financial	   punishment	  
sentenced	  by	  the	  high	  court	  has	  shrunk	  to	  Rp2.39	  trillion	  ($	  277.79	  million)	  or	  only	  3.27%	  of	  the	  total	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption.	   In	   the	   final	   stage,	   when	   the	   cases	   were	   appealed	   to	   the	  supreme	  court,	   the	   total	  number	  of	  defendants	  who	  were	   found	  guilty	  by	  the	  supreme	  court	  was	   544	   individuals.	   The	   total	   financial	   punishment	   sentenced	   by	   the	   supreme	   court	   has	  increased	   to	   Rp5.33	   trillion	   ($	   619.77	   million)	   or	   about	   7.29%	   of	   the	   total	   explicit	   cost	   of	  corruption.	  	  Table	   4	   shows	   the	   discrepancies	   between	   the	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption,	   the	   total	   financial	  punishment	   prosecuted,	   the	   total	   financial	   punishment	   sentenced	   by	   district	   courts	   and	   the	  total	   financial	   punishment	   sentenced	   by	   the	   supreme	   court.	   	   The	   overall	   ratio	   between	   the	  explicit	   costs	   of	   corruption	   with	   the	   total	   financial	   punishment	   prosecuted	   is	   5	   to	   3.	   It	   is	  surprising	  the	  defendants	  only	  be	  prosecuted	  60%	  of	  the	  total	  explicit	  cost	  that	  the	  defendants	  inflicted	  to	  the	  society.	  As	  the	  trials	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  bargaining	  problem,	  meaning	  that	  most	  likely	   judges	  sentenced	  the	  defendant	  much	  lesser	  than	  the	  prosecution,	   it	  would	  be	  rational	  for	  the	  prosecutors	  to	  prosecute	  defendants	  with	  financial	  punishment	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  explicit	  costs	  that	  they	  were	  inflicted.	  The	  reason	  to	  support	  this	  argument	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  corruption	  covers	  only	  the	  explicit	  cost	  and	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  opportunity	  costs	  incurred	  due	  to	  the	  misallocation	  of	  resources	  owing	  to	  the	  corruption.	  	  	  On	  the	  contrary	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to	  the	  prescription	  given	  by	  bargaining	  theory	  (Nash,	  1951,	  Rubinstein,	  1982,	  among	  others),	  in	   Indonesia	   there	   has	   been	   a	   strong	   tendency	   to	   prosecute	   defendants	   with	   financial	  punishment	  that	  is	  much	  lower	  than	  the	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption.	  
Table	   4:	   Ratios	   between	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption	   and	   the	   financial	   punishment	   sentenced	   in	  
district	  courts	  and	  the	  supreme	  court	  
	  	   Total	  Explicit	  Costs	  (2008	  Prices)	   Financial	  Punishment	  Prosecuted	  (B)	  
Financial	  Punishment	  Sentenced	  by	  Judges	  in	  District	  courts	  	  (C)	  
Financial	  Punishment	  Sentenced	  by	  Judges	  in	  the	  	  Supreme	  court	  (D)	  
(B/A)	   (C/A)  (D/A) 
Gender	   Male	   Rp73.05	  trillion	  	   32.40	  trillion	  	   Rp2.38	  trillion	  	   Rp5.31	  trillion	   44.35%	   3.26% 7.27% ($8.494	  billion)	   ($3.77	  billion)	   ($276.74	  million)	   ($617.44	  million)	  Female	   Rp19.99	  billion	  	   12.33	  billion	  	   3.22	  billion	  	   Rp10.63	  billion	  	   61.68%	   16.11% 53.18% ($2.32	  million)	   ($1.43	  million)	   ($374,419)	   ($1.24	  million)	  
Age	   Below	  60	   Rp38.72	  trillon	  	   3.84	  trillion	  	   Rp2.13	  trillion	  	   Rp2.73	  trillion	  	   9.92%	   5.50% 7.05% ($4.50	  billion)	   ($447	  million)	   ($247.67	  million)	   ($301.42	  million)	  60	  or	  Above	   Rp34.34	  trillion	  	   Rp28.56	  trillion	  	   Rp259.22	  billion	  	   Rp2.59	  trillion	   83.17%	   0.75% 7.54% ($3.99	  billion)	   ($3.32	  billion)	   ($30.14	  million)	   ($301.16	  milion)	  
Location	  
Jawa	   Rp37.36	  trillion	  	   Rp32.01	  trillion	  	   Rp2.39	  trillion	  	   Rp4.99	  trillion	  	   85.68%	   6.40% 13.36% ($4.34	  billion)	   ($3.72	  billion)	   ($277.91	  Million)	   ($580.23	  million)	  	  	  	  Greater	  Jakarta	   Rp36.87	  trillion	  	   Rp31.56	  trillion	  	   Rp1.95	  trillion	  	   Rp4.81	  trillion	  	   85.60%	   5.29% 13.05% ($4.29	  billion)	   ($3.67	  billion)	   ($226.74	  million)	   ($559.30	  million)	  Outside	  Jawa	   Rp35.70	  trillion	  	   Rp401.70	  billion	  	   Rp85.34	  billion	  	   Rp328.63	  billion	   1.13%	  	  	   0.24%   0.92%   ($4.15	  billion)	   ($46.71	  million)	   ($9.92	  million)	   ($38.21	  million)	  
Occupation	  
Civil	  Servant	   Rp470.15	  billion	  	   Rp219.38	  billion	  	   Rp120.94	  billion	  	   Rp135.76	  billion	  	   46.66%	  	  	   25.72%   28.88%   ($54.67	  million)	   ($25.51	  million)	   ($14.06	  million)	   ($15.79	  million)	  State-­‐owned	  Enterprise	  Employee	   Rp29.33	  trillion	  	   Rp29.16	  trillion	  	   Rp150.08	  billion	  	   Rp2.48	  trillion	  	   99.42%	  	  	   5.12%   8.46%   ($3.41	  billion)	   ($3.39	  billion)	   ($17.45	  million)	   ($288.37	  million)	  Legislative	   Rp216.65	  billion	   Rp102.10	  billion	  	   Rp58.67	  billion	  	   Rp55.12	  billion	   47.13%	  	  	   27.08%   25.44%   ($25.19	  million)	   ($11.87	  million)	   ($6.82	  million)	   ($6.41	  million)	  Private	  Sector	   Rp37.75	  trillion	  	   Rp2.92	  trillion	  	   Rp2.06	  trillion	  	   Rp2.65	  trillion	  	   7.74%	  	  	   5.46%   7.02%   ($4.39	  billion)	   ($340	  billion)	   ($239.53	  million)	   ($308.14	  million)	  
Source:	  	  The	  Supreme	  court	  Decisions	  2001-­‐2009,	  estimated.	  Information	  in	  the	  column	  ratio	  B/A	  represent	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  total	  financial	  punishment	  prosecuted	   and	   the	   total	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption	   across	   gender,	   age,	   geographical	  distributions	  and	  occupations.	  Both	  values	  were	  estimated	  by	  the	  same	  individuals,	  namely	  the	  prosecutors,	   however,	   surprisingly	   both	   values	   are	   significantly	   different.	   	   The	   majority	   of	  corruption	   in	   Indonesia	   have	   been	   committed	   by	   male,	   however	   there	   is	   a	   tendency	   that	  female	  corruptors	  (61.68%)	  were	  prosecuted	  with	  higher	  financial	  punishment	  as	  opposed	  to	  their	  male	   counterparts	   (44,35%).	  Corruptors	   in	   their	  productive	  age	   tend	   to	  be	  prosecuted	  with	   lesser	   financial	   punishment	   (only	   9.92%)	   then	   offenders	   aged	   60	   year	   old	   or	   above	  (83.17%).	  Offenders	  who	  committed	  corruption	  in	  Jawa	  (86.68%),	  tend	  to	  be	  prosecuted	  much	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more	  heavily	   in	   comparison	   to	   those	  who	  conducted	   corruption	   in	  outside	   Jawa	   (1.13%).	   In	  term	  of	  occupation,	  offenders	  who	  previously	  worked	  as	  state-­‐own	  enterprise	  employees	  were	  prosecuted	  much	  heavier	  (99.42%)	  in	  comparison	  to	  corruptors	  who	  previously	  worked	  in	  the	  other	  occupations.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  corruptors	  who	  previously	  worked	  in	  private	  sector	  were	  prosecuted	  the	  most	  leniently	  in	  comparison	  to	  those	  of	  from	  the	  other	  occupations.	  	  The	   column	   ratio	   C/A	   measures	   the	   proportion	   of	   	   financial	   punishment	   sentenced	   by	   the	  district	   courts	   and	   the	   total	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption.	   The	   column	   ratio	   D/A,	   furthermore,	  measures	  the	  proportion	  of	  financial	  punishment	  sentenced	  by	  the	  supreme	  court	  and	  the	  total	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption.	  	  The	  estimations	   in	   the	  column	  ratio	  C/A	  are	  much	   lesser	   than	   those	  of	   in	   column	  ratio	  B/A.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  financial	  punishment	  sentenced	  by	  judges	  in	  the	  district	  courts	  are	  much	  lesser	  than	  both	  the	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption	  and	  the	  financial	  punishment	  prosecuted	  by	  the	  prosecutors.	  In	  most	  cases,	  the	  ratios	  of	  C/A	  across	  gender,	  age,	  geographical	  distributions	  and	  occupations	  were	   less	   then	  10%,	  unless	   for	   female	   corruptors	   (16.11%),	   and	  offenders	  who	  previously	  worked	  as	  civil	  servant	  (25.72%)	  and	  member	  of	  the	  parliament	  (27.08%).	  The	   ratios	   of	   D/A	   across	   gender,	   age,	   geographical	   distribution	   and	   occupations	   tend	   to	   be	  higher	   rather	   than	   those	   of	   in	   the	   column	   ratio	   C/A.	   This	   implies	   that	   the	   decisions	   by	   the	  supreme	  court	  provides	  positive	  corrections	  toward	  the	  sentenced	  made	  by	  the	  district	  courts.	  	  The	  male	  offenders	  tend	  to	  receive	  lesser	  financial	  punishment	  (7.27%)	  by	  the	  supreme	  court	  as	   opposed	   to	   their	   female	   counterparts	   (53.18%).	   Both	   offenders	   who	   were	   in	   their	  productive	  age	  and	  more	  senior	  offenders	  received	  almost	  similar	  financial	  punishment	  by	  the	  supreme	  court,	  namely	  about	  7%	  of	  the	  total	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption.	   	  A	  substantial	  gap	  in	  the	  ratios	  of	  D/A	  was	  found	  for	  offenders	  who	  committed	  corruption	  in	  Jawa	  and	  outside	  Jawa.	  Those	   who	   committed	   corruption	   in	   Jawa	   has	   the	   ratio	   of	   D/A	   13.36%,	   whereas	   their	  counterparts	  in	  outside	  Jawa	  only	  received	  financial	  punishment	  by	  the	  supreme	  court	  0.92%	  of	  the	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption.	  The	  features	  of	  the	  ratios	  D/A	  has	  similar	  feature	  those	  of	  the	  ratios	  of	  C/A	  across	  different	  occupations.	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Table	  5:	  The	  Average	  Explicit	  Cost	  and	  the	  Average	  Financial	  Punishment	  Across	  Gender,	  Age,	  Geographical	  Distribution	  and	  Occupations	  
	  	   Number	  of	  Offenders	   Average	  Explicit	  Costs	  (2008	  Prices)	   Average	  Financial	  Punishment	  Prosecuted	  	  
Average	  Financial	  Punishment	  Sentenced	  by	  Judges	  in	  District	  courts	  	  	  
Average	  Financial	  Punishment	  Sentenced	  by	  Judges	  in	  the	  	  Supreme	  court	  	  
Gender	   Male	   504	  
Rp145.63	  billion	   Rp64.29	  billion	   Rp4.72	  billion	   Rp10.54	  billion	  
($16.93	  million)	   ($7.48	  million)	   ($549,091)	   ($1.23	  million)	  
Female	   36	   Rp555.28	  million	   Rp342.5	  million	   Rp89.44	  million	   Rp295.28	  million	  ($64,567)	   ($39,826)	   ($10,401)	   ($34,335)	  
Age	  
Below	  60	   479	   Rp80.84	  billion	   Rp8.02	  billion	   Rp4.45	  billion	   Rp5.70	  billion	  ($9.40	  million)	   ($932.17	  million)	   ($517,066)	   ($662,718)	  
60	  or	  Above	   60	   Rp572.33	  billion	   Rp476.00	  billion	   Rp4.32	  billion	   Rp43.17	  billion	  ($66.55	  million)	   ($55.35	  million)	   ($502.36	  million)	   ($5.02	  million)	  
Location	  
Jawa	   241	   Rp155.02	  billion	   Rp132.82	  billion	   Rp9.92	  billion	   Rp20.71	  billion	  
($18.03	  million)	   ($15.44	  million)	   ($1.15	  million)	   ($2.41	  million)	  	  	  	  Greater	  Jakarta	   78	   Rp472.69	  billion	   Rp404.62	  billion	   Rp25.00	  billion	   Rp61.67	  billion	  ($54.96	  million)	   ($47.05	  million)	   ($2.91	  million)	   ($7.17	  million)	  
Outside	  Jawa	   299	   Rp119.40	  billion	   Rp1.34	  billion	   Rp285.42	  million	   Rp1.10	  billion	  ($13.88	  million)	   ($156,218)	   ($33,188)	   ($127,802)	  
Occupation	  
Civil	  Servant	   223	   Rp2.101	  billion	   Rp983.77	  million	   Rp542.33	  million	   Rp608.79	  million	  ($245,151)	   ($114,391)	   ($63,062)	   ($70,789)	  State-­‐owned	  Enterprise	  Employee	   68	  
Rp431.32	  billion	   Rp428.82	  billion	   Rp2.21	  billion	   Rp36.47	  billion	  ($50.15	  million)	   ($49.86	  million)	   ($.256,635)	   ($4.24	  million)	  
Legislative	   130	   Rp1.67	  billion	   Rp785.38	  million	   Rp451.31	  million	   Rp424	  million	  
($193,784)	   ($91,324)	   ($52,478)	   ($49,302)	  Private	  Sector	   117	   Rp322.65	  billion	   Rp24.96	  billion	   Rp17.61	  billion	   Rp22.65	  billion	  ($37.52	  million)	   ($2.90	  million)	   ($2.05	  million)	   ($2.63	  million)	  
Source:	  	  The	  Supreme	  court	  Decisions	  2001-­‐2009,	  estimated.	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The	  Supreme	  Court	  Decisions	  There	  are	  various	  ways	  to	  assess	  court	  decisions.	  	  In	  this	  study,	  a	  logistic	  regression	  is	  used	  to	  various	   criminogenic	   factors	   which	   may	   influence	   decisions	   made	   by	   judges.	   A	   logistic	  regression	  uses	  a	  dependent	  variable	  in	  the	  form	  of	  binary	  alternatives	  (e.g.,	  to	  be	  fined	  or	  not,	  to	  be	  imprisonement	  or	  not	  etc)	  which	  will	  be	  on	  the	  left	  hand	  side	  of	  the	  equation,	  and	  various	  independent	   variables	   or	   explanatory	   variables	   on	   the	   right	   hand	   side	   of	   the	   equation.	   The	  criterion	  used	   to	   judge	  whether	   the	  covariates	   that	  are	   included	  are	  a	   significant	  part	  of	   the	  explanation	  is	  whether	  the	  value	  in	  the	  Sig	  column	  is	  less	  than	  0.05	  (for	  5%	  significance	  level)	  and	  less	  than	  0.01	  (for	  1%	  significance	  level).	  	  
The	  Likelihood	  of	  Conviction	  The	  following	  econometric	  model	  is	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  Supreme	  courts	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  defendant	  was	  found	  guilty	  as	  charged	  by	  the	  supreme	  court	  judges	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
Whereby:	  
SCguilty	  :	   	   The	  Supreme	  court	  decisions,	  1	  =	  guilty,	  0	  =	  otherwise	  
Age	  :	   	   Age	  of	  offenders	  when	  they	  were	  sentenced	  by	  District	  courts.	  
Gender	  	  :	  	   1	  for	  male	  and	  0	  for	  female	  
D_Jawa	  :	  	   Dummy	  variable	  for	  location,	  1	  =	  the	  island	  of	  Jawa,	  0	  =	  outside	  Jawa	  
D_SOE	  	   :	  	   Dummy	  variable	  for	  occupation,	  1	  =	  State-­‐owned	  Enterprises	  Employees,	  0	  =	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  otherwise	  
D_MP	  	   :	  	   Dummy	  variable	  for	  occupation,	  1	  =	  members	  of	  the	  parliaments	  both	  in	  local	  and	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  national	  levels,	  0	  =	  otherwise	  
D_Private	  :	  	   Dummy	  variable	  for	  occupation,	  1	  =	  private	  sector,	  0	  =	  otherwise	  
Log_ExplicitCost	  :	  log(explicit	  costs	  of	  corruption	  at	  nominal	  price)	  
DC_guilty	  :	  	   Dummy	  variable	  whether	  district	  courts	  found	  the	  defendants	  guilty	  as	  charged;	  1	  =	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  guilty,	  0	  :	  otherwise	  
DSOE*log_ExpCost:	  Interaction	  between	  dummy	  variable	  whether	  defendant	  was	  a	  State	  Own	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Enterprise	  Employee	  and	  log(explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption	  inflicted	  by	  the	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  defendant)	  
DSenator*log_ExpCost:	  Interaction	  between	  dummy	  variable	  whether	  defendant	  was	  a	  senator	  and	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  log(explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption	  inflicted	  by	  the	  defendant)	  
DPrivate*log_ExpCost:	  Interaction	  between	  dummy	  variable	  whether	  defendant	  was	  a	  civil	  servant	  and	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  log(explicit	  costs	  of	  corruption	  inflicted	  by	  the	  defendant)	  
	  The	   equations	   above	   are	   based	   on	   assumption	   that	   the	   likelihood	   of	   conviction	   may	   be	  associated	  with	  various	  static	  and	  dynamic	  criminogenic	  factors.	  Gender	  and	  the	  distric	  courts	  decisions	   are	   considered	   as	   static	   criminogenic	   factors,	   whereas	   age	   and	   occupations	   are	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classified	   as	   dynamic	   criminogenic	   factors.	   Under	   the	   Indonesia	   criminal	   penal	   system,	   the	  trials	  are	  conducted	  in	  the	  area	  where	  the	  offence	  has	  been	  committed.	  Although	  Jawa	  is	  one	  of	  17,508	  islands	  in	  Indonesia,	  however	  the	  island	  of	  Jawa	  is	  the	  centre	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  activities	  in	  Indonesia.	  	  The	  area	  of	  the	  island	  of	  Jawa	  is	  about	  7%	  of	  the	  total	  area	  in	  Indonesia,	  however	   of	   the	  240	  million	  population	   in	   Indonesia,	   about	   60%	  of	   them	   (about	  114	  million	  people)	   live	   in	   Jawa.	   	   It	  may	  not	  be	   surprising	   if	   the	  development	   in	   Jawa	   is	  more	  advanced	  than	   the	   other	   islands	   in	   Indonesia.	   Based	   on	   this	   reason,	   a	   dummy	   variable	   has	   been	  generated	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  whether	  there	  are	  differences	  in	  decisions	  between	  courts	  in	  Jawa	  and	  outside	  Jawa.	  	  	  Results	  from	  descriptive	  statistic	  showed	  that	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  varies	  across	  occupations	  (see	  table	  1-­‐5	  above).	  This	  notion	  is	  accommodated	  in	  the	  model	  by	  generating	  three	  dummies	  variables	  aim	  to	  capture	  the	  role	  occuption	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  supreme	  court	  decisions.	  In	  the	  model,	   the	   civil	   servant	   has	   been	   used	   as	   the	   reference	   group	   for	   a	   set	   of	   dummy	  variables	  which	  represent	  occupation.	  	  	  The	  logistic	  regression	  models	  have	  been	  developed	  based	  on	  assumption	  that	  the	  likelihood	  of	  receiving	  	  types	  of	  punishment	  may	  associated	  with	  dynamic	  and	  criminogenic	  factors.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  the	  types	  of	  punishment	  may	  correspond	  with	  the	  nominal	  value	  of	  the	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption.	  The	  use	  of	  nominal	  values	  for	  the	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption	  is	  based	  on	  assumption	  that	  both	  prosecutors	  and	  judges	  do	  not	  consider	  the	  real	  value	  of	  the	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption.	  Instead,	  they	  considered	  the	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption	  according	  to	  the	  current	  price	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  constant	  price.	  The	  last	  three	  independent	  variables	  in	  the	  model	  are	  the	  interaction	  variables	  between	  dummy	  variables	  for	  occupations	  and	  the	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .	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Table	  6:	  Logistic	  Regression	  Analyses	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  Sentences	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  SC_Guilty_YN	  
Sample:	  1	  831;	  Included	  observations:	  811;	  Excluded	  
observations:	  20	  
	  	   Coeff.	   S.E	   Prob.	  	  	  
C	   1.445	   2.15	   0.501	  
DC_Guilty_YN	   3.282	   1.124	   0.004***	  
Gender	   0.118	   0.368	   0.748	  
Log(Age)	   -­‐0.922	   0.511	   0.071*	  
D_Jawa	   0.44	   0.219	   0.045**	  
D_Greater	  Jakarta	   -­‐0.316	   0.39	   0.418	  
D_SOE_empl.	   -­‐5.016	   3.883	   0.196	  
D_MP	   4.29	   2.486	   0.084*	  
D_Private	   2.639	   1.703	   0.121	  
D_Appeal_HC	   -­‐0.62	   1.125	   0.582	  
D_JudRev	   1.663	   0.404	   0.000***	  
Log_ExplicitCost	   0.047	   0.059	   0.425	  
Log_ExpCost*D_BUMN	   0.314	   0.192	   0.102	  
Log_ExpCost*D_MP	   -­‐0.24	   0.126	   0.057*	  
Log_ExpCost*D_Private	   -­‐0.116	   0.086	   0.175	  
Mean	  dependent	  var	  
	   	  
0.663	  
S.E.	  of	  regression	  
	   	  
0.377	  
Sum	  squared	  resid	  
	   	  
113.3	  
Log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐359.9	  
Restr.	  log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐518	  
LR	  statistic	  (11	  df)	  
	   	  
316.2	  
Probability(LR	  stat)	  
	   	  
0	  
	  	  	  	  McFadden	  R-­‐squared	   	  	   	  	   0.305	  
Source:	  The	  Supreme	  court	  Decisions	  2001-­‐2009,	  to	  be	  estimated.	  	  Table	  6	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  that	  judges	  in	  the	  supreme	  court	  support	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  judges	  in	  the	  district	  courts.	  	  This	  finding	  may	  be	  contradicted	  with	  the	  tendency	  that	  both	  defendants	   and	  prosecutors	   tend	   to	   appeal	   to	   any	  decisions	  made	  by	   judges	   in	  district	  courts	   if	   the	   decisions	   are	   not	   in	   their	   favour.	   	   In	   addition,	   defendants	   who	   committed	  corruption	  and	  were	  trialed	  in	  Jawa,	  tend	  to	  have	  a	  lower	  probability	  to	  be	  found	  guilty	  by	  the	  supreme	   judges,	   even	   though	   statistically	   the	   result	   if	   weakly	   significant.	   This	   finding	   is	  interesting	   since	   the	   average	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption	   inflicted	   by	   offenders	   in	   Jawa	  (Rp155.03	   billion	   or	   US$18.03	   million)	   was	   higher	   than	   that	   of	   offenders	   outside	   Jawa	  (Rp119.41	  billion	  or	  US$13.89	  million).	  Nevertheless,	   if	  defendants	   in	   Jawa	  are	   found	  guilty,	  then	  the	  average	  financial	  punishment	  sentenced	  by	  the	  supreme	  court	  was	  	  $2.41	  million	  or	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about	  18.86	  time	  folds	  higher	  than	  their	  counterparts	  in	  outside	  Jawa.	  The	  result	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  detection	  rate	  of	  corruption	  in	  outside	  Jawa	  tend	  to	  be	  higher	  than	  in	  Jawa,	  however	  prosecutors	  in	  outside	  Jawa	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  lenient	  toward	  the	  defendants.	  	  




SC_Imprisonment	  =	  the	  Supreme	  court	  sentenced	  offenders	  with	  imprisonment,	  1	  =	  Yes,	  0	  =	  No	  
SC_Probation=	  the	  Supreme	  court	  sentenced	  offenders	  with	  probation,	  1	  =	  Yes,	  0	  =	  No	  
	  The	  result	  in	  Table	  7	  suggests	  that	  the	  likelihood	  of	  sentencing	  defendants	  with	  imprisonment	  does	  not	  correspond	  with	  the	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption.	  There	  is	  no	  proof,	  whether	  the	  higher	  the	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption	  inflicted	  to	  the	  economy	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  offenders	  to	  receive	  imprisonment.	  In	  addition,	  the	  higher	  the	  explicit	  costs	  of	  corruption	  inflicted	  by	  MPs,	  are	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   sentenced	   with	   imprisonment	   in	   comparison	   with	   their	   civil	   servant	  counterparts,	  even	  though	  the	  impact	  is	  relatively	  weak.	  	  The	  anti	  corruption	  act	  20/2001	  stated	  clearly	  that	  in	  some	  offences	  imprisonment	  and	  fines	  should	   be	   imposed	   together	   to	   offenders.	   The	  more	   serious	   an	   offence	   is	   considered,	  more	  severe	  the	  types	  and	  intensity	  of	  punishment	  [see	  Appendix	  A].	  	  Imprisonment	  is	  an	  indicator	  that	  the	  type	  of	  offences	  committed	  by	  offenders	  may	  be	  quite	  serious.	  Similarly,	  the	  value	  of	  financial	   punishment	   prosecuted	   can	   be	   used	   as	   an	   indicator	   how	   serious	   the	   offence	   is,	  however,	  the	  results	  show	  that	  the	  decisions	  to	  sentence	  defendants	  with	  imprisonment	  do	  not	  taken	  into	  consideration	  the	  scale	  of	  damaged	  due	  to	  corruption.	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Table	  7:	  Logistic	  Regressions	  of	  the	  Likelihood	  of	  Imprisonment	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  SC_Imprisonment_YN	   Dependent	  Variable:	  SC_Probation_YN	  
Sample(adjusted):	  4	  831;	  Included	  observations:	  472;	  
Excluded	  observations:	  356	  	  
Sample(adjusted):	  2	  830;	  Included	  observations:	  463;	  
Excluded	  observations:	  366	  	  
	  	   Coeff.	   S.E	   Prob.	  	  	   	  	   Coeff.	   S.E	   Prob.	  	  	  
C	   -­‐2.975	   4.166	   0.475	   C	   0.215	   5.022	   0.966	  
DC_Imprisonment_YN	   1.661	   1.643	   0.312	   DC_Probation_YN	   -­‐0.033	   0.812	   0.967	  
Gender	   -­‐0.198	   0.846	   0.816	   Gender	   0.577	   1.067	   0.589	  
Log(Age)	   0.887	   0.97	   0.36	   Log(Age)	   0.148	   1.134	   0.896	  
D_Jawa	   -­‐0.385	   0.428	   0.368	   D_Jawa	   0.181	   0.464	   0.697	  
D_Greater	  Jakarta	   1.177	   1.179	   0.318	   D_Greater	  Jakarta	   -­‐0.521	   0.869	   0.549	  
D_SOE_empl.	   3.959	   8.93	   0.658	   D_SOE_empl.	   2.612	   8.445	   0.757	  
D_MP	   -­‐10.829	   6.311	   0.086*	   D_MP	   -­‐22.12	   8.097	   0.006***	  
D_Private	   -­‐2.34	   4.263	   0.583	   D_Private	   -­‐10.238	   4.467	   0.022**	  
D_Appeal_HC	   1.804	   1.64	   0.271	   D_Appeal_HC	   1.349	   1.047	   0.198	  
D_JudRev	   1.668	   0.845	   0.049**	   D_JudRev	   -­‐0.839	   0.806	   0.298	  
Log_ExplicitCost	   -­‐0.045	   0.133	   0.734	   Log_ExplicitCost	   -­‐0.271	   0.125	   0.030**	  
Log_ExpCost*D_BUMN	   -­‐0.121	   0.422	   0.775	   Log_ExpCost*D_BUMN	   -­‐0.132	   0.442	   0.765	  
Log_ExpCost*D_MP	   0.56	   0.333	   0.093*	   Log_ExpCost*D_MP	   1.036	   0.379	   0.006***	  
Log_ExpCost*D_Private	   0.135	   0.224	   0.547	   Log_ExpCost*D_Private	   0.518	   0.223	   0.020***	  
Mean	  dependent	  var	   	  	   	  	   0.888	   Mean	  dependent	  var	   	  	   	  	   0.06	  
S.E.	  of	  regression	  
	   	  
0.248	   S.E.	  of	  regression	  
	   	  
0.233	  
Sum	  squared	  resid	  
	   	  
28.087	   Sum	  squared	  resid	  
	   	  
24.4	  
Log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐107.3	   Log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐93.9	  
Restr.	  log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐165.8	   Restr.	  log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐105.7	  
LR	  statistic	  (11	  df)	  
	   	  
117	   LR	  statistic	  (11	  df)	  
	   	  
23.5	  
Probability(LR	  stat)	  
	   	  
0	   Probability(LR	  stat)	  
	   	  
0.052	  
	  	  	  	  McFadden	  R-­‐squared	   	  	   	  	   0.353	   	  	  	  	  McFadden	  R-­‐squared	   	  	   	  	   0.111	  
Source:	  The	  Supreme	  court	  Decisions	  2001-­‐2009,	  to	  be	  estimated	  A	  more	  conter	  intuitive	  result	  occurs	  for	  the	  decision	  to	  sentence	  defendants	  with	  probation.	  The	   result	   in	   Table	   7	   shows	   that	   the	   higher	   the	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption	   the	   lesser	   the	  likelihood	   of	   the	   defendants	   to	   be	   sentenced	   with	   probation.	   The	   result	   does	   not	   support	  hypothesis	   that	   the	   more	   serious	   corruptors	   tend	   to	   be	   sentenced	   with	   imprisonment	   as	  opposed	  to	  probation.	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  tendency	  that	  offenders	  with	  occupations	  as	  member	  of	  the	  parliament	  and	  in	  private	  sectors	  received	  lower	  sentenced	  to	  probation	  in	  comparison	  to	   their	  civil	  servant	  counterparts.	  Nevertheless,	  both	  member	  of	   the	  parliament	  and	  private	  sector	  who	   commit	  more	   serious	   gravity	   of	   corruption	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   be	   sentenced	  with	  probation	  as	  opposed	  to	  their	  civil	  servant	  counterparts.	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In	  many	   countries	   in	   Europe,	   imprisonment	   is	   sentenced	   to	   defendants	   only	   if	   the	   types	   of	  offending	   are	   considered	   quite	   serious,	   namely	   the	   offence	   gravity6	   committed	   by	   the	  offenders	  is	  relatively	  high.	  	  The	  intensity	  of	  offences	  is	  estimated	  by	  how	  serious	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  offence	  to	  victims	  and	  even	  the	  society.	   	  In	  the	  UK	  for	  instance,	  corruption	  is	  classified	  as	  one	  of	  serious	  offences,	  therefore	  most	  likely	  individuals	  who	  were	  proven	  guilty	  of	  conducting	  corruption	  will	  be	  sentenced	  by	  imprisonment.	  	  In	   Indonesia,	   corruption	   is	   considered	   also	   as	   extra	   ordinary	   crime.	   As	   the	   social	   costs	   of	  corruption	  are	  high,	  then	  ideally	  judges	  can	  use	  the	  value	  of	  financial	  punishment	  prosecuted	  as	   a	   proxy	   to	   estimate	   how	   serious	   the	   case	   is.	   It	   is	   surprising,	   however,	   that	   judges	   in	   the	  supreme	  court	  do	  not	  taken	  into	  consideration	  the	  value	  of	  financial	  punishment	  prosecuted	  as	  a	  means	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  offenders	  should	  be	  sentenced	  with	  imprisonment	  or	  probation.	  	  In	   the	   case	   for	  which	   the	   likelihood	   of	   receiving	   imprisonment	   does	   not	   corresponse	   to	   the	  economic	  burden	   inflicted	  by	  offenders	   to	   the	  society,	   then	   judges’	  decisions,	  at	   least,	  do	  not	  taken	   into	   consideration	   the	   concept	   of	   fairness	   proposed	   by	   Rabin	   (1993).	   Rabin	   (1993)	  argued	  that	  fairness	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  reciprocal	  relationship	  rather	  than	  altruistic	  behaviour.	  Implementing	  Rabin’s	  (1993)	  concept	  of	  fairness	  to	  sentencing,	  ideally,	  offenders	  who	  inflicted	  high	   social	   costs	   to	   society	   should	   be	   punished	   heavier,	   and	   imprisonment	   is	   a	   type	   of	  punishment	  which	  considered	  tough.	  	  The	  result	  shows	  that	  defendants	  who	  worked	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  parliament	  were	  more	  likely	  to	   be	   sentenced	   with	   probation	   in	   comparison	   with	   other	   defendants	   with	   different	  occupations.	   Similarly,	   the	   social	   cost	   of	   corruption	   inflicted	   by	   senator	   (the	   interaction	  variable	   between	   senator	   and	   the	   social	   cost)	  was	  more	   likely	   to	   be	  used	   as	   an	   indicator	   to	  determine	  probation	  order.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  these	  findings	  are	  valid	  only	  at	  significant	  level	  10%.	  	  
Fines	  and	  the	  Subsidiary	  of	  Fines	  As	  Indonesia	  follows	  civil	  law,	  not	  only	  does	  the	  anticorruption	  act	  regulate	  any	  conduct	  that	  can	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   corruption	   but	   also	   it	   states	   clearly	   the	   types	   and	   the	   intensity	   of	  punishment	  for	  each	  offence.	  	  The	  reason	  behind	  this	  is	  the	  aim	  to	  maintain	  the	  legal	  certainty,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  In	  the	  UK,	  the	  seriousness	  of	  an	  offence	  is	  classified	  by	  offence	  gravity	  which	  index	  is	  ranging	  from	  1	  (the	  lightest)	  to	  8	  
(the	  most	  serious	  offence,	  such	  as	  homicide,	  etc).	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SC_Fines	  =	  the	  Supreme	  court	  sentenced	  offenders	  with	  fines,	  1	  =	  Yes,	  0	  =	  Otherwise	  
SC_Subs_fines=	  the	  Supreme	  court	  sentenced	  offenders	  with	  subsidiary	  of	  the	  fines,	  1	  =	  Yes,	  0	  =	  Otherwise	  
	  The	  modelling	  of	  fines	  is	  similar	  to	  models	  in	  the	  previous	  sections.	  In	  the	  modelling	  of	  logistic	  regression	   for	   subsidiary	   of	   fines,	   the	   value	   of	   the	   fines	   	   has	   been	   included	   in	   explanatory	  variables.	   	   The	   notion	   of	   subsidiary	   punishment	   is	   based	   on	   assumption	   that	   the	   main	  punishment	  has	  little	  deterrence	  effect.	  Transforming	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  main	  punishment	  to	  become	   the	  period	   	  of	   imprisonment	   is	   the	  way	   to	   improve	   the	   credibility	  of	   the	  deterrence	  effect	  of	  the	  main	  punishment.	  Consequently,	   it	   is	  expected	  that	  the	  higher	  the	  value	  of	  fines,	  the	  more	  likely	  the	  subsidiary	  of	  fines	  will	  be	  sentenced	  to	  offenders.	  	  	  Table	  8	  shows	  that	  defendants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  sentenced	  by	  the	  supreme	  judges	  with	  fines	  and	  or	  the	  subsidiary	  of	  fines	  if	  previously	  they	  were	  fines	  and	  or	  subsidiary	  of	  fines	  in	  district	   courts.	   The	   value	   of	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption	   committed	   does	   affect	   the	   supreme	  judges	  to	  sentence	  offenders	  with	  fines,	  even	  though	  the	  impact	  is	  weak.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  value	  of	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption	  affects	  significantly	  to	  the	  likelihood	  of	  offenders	  to	  be	  sentenced	  with	  subsidiary	  of	  fines.	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Table	  8:	  Logistic	  Regression	  of	  the	  Likelihood	  of	  Fines	  and	  Subsidiary	  of	  Fines	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  SC_Fines_YN	   Dependent	  Variable:	  SC_Fines_Subs_YN	  
Sample(adjusted):	  4	  831;	  Included	  observations:	  516;	  
Excluded	  observations:	  312	  
Sample(adjusted):	  4	  831;	  Included	  observations:	  515;	  
Excluded	  observations:	  313	  
	  	   Coeff.	   S.E	   Prob.	  	  	   	  	   Coeff.	   S.E	   Prob.	  	  	  
C	   -­‐8.103	   3.564	   0.023	   C	   -­‐8.597	   3.618	   0.018	  
DC_Fines_YN	   4.195	   0.511	   0.00***	   DC_Fines_Subs_YN	   4.106	   0.483	   0.00***	  
Gender	   0.347	   0.626	   0.58	   Gender	   0.108	   0.647	   0.867	  
Log(Age)	   0.786	   0.777	   0.312	   Log(Age)	   0.82	   0.785	   0.296	  
D_Jawa	   0.672	   0.348	   0.054*	   D_Jawa	   0.671	   0.351	   0.056*	  
D_Greater	  Jakarta	   -­‐0.479	   0.706	   0.497	   D_Greater	  Jakarta	   -­‐0.588	   0.71	   0.407	  
D_SOE_empl.	   4.297	   5.801	   0.459	   D_SOE_empl.	   4.238	   5.838	   0.468	  
D_MP	   1.738	   4.203	   0.679	   D_MP	   2.356	   4.245	   0.579	  
D_Private	   2.41	   3.272	   0.462	   D_Private	   3.186	   3.334	   0.339	  
D_Appeal_HC	   -­‐1.12	   0.58	   0.054*	   D_Appeal_HC	   -­‐0.962	   0.553	   0.082*	  
D_JudRev	   0.225	   0.461	   0.626	   D_JudRev	   0.376	   0.471	   0.425	  
Log_ExplicitCost	   0.198	   0.103	   0.055*	   Log_ExplicitCost	   0.229	   0.105	   0.030**	  
Log_ExpCost*D_BUMN	   -­‐0.158	   0.285	   0.579	   Log_ExplicitCost*D_BUMN	   -­‐0.162	   0.287	   0.572	  
Log_ExpCost*D_MP	   -­‐0.117	   0.218	   0.589	   Log_ExplicitCost*D_MP	   -­‐0.154	   0.22	   0.483	  
Log_ExpCost*D_Private	   -­‐0.114	   0.17	   0.503	   Log_ExplicitCost*D_Private	   -­‐0.152	   0.173	   0.379	  
Mean	  dependent	  var	   	  	   	  	   0.771	   Mean	  dependent	  var	   	  	   	  	   0.771	  
S.E.	  of	  regression	  
	   	  
0.31	   S.E.	  of	  regression	  
	   	  
0.306	  
Sum	  squared	  resid	  
	   	  
48.032	   Sum	  squared	  resid	  
	   	  
46.884	  
Log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐165.5	   Log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐162.4	  
Restr.	  log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐277.4	   Restr.	  log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐277.2	  
LR	  statistic	  (11	  df)	  
	   	  
223.8	   LR	  statistic	  (11	  df)	  
	   	  
229.5	  
Probability(LR	  stat)	  
	   	  
0	   Probability(LR	  stat)	  
	   	  
0	  
	  	  	  	  McFadden	  R-­‐squared	   	  	   	  	   0.403	   	  	  	  	  McFadden	  R-­‐squared	   	  	   	  	   0.414	  
Source:	  The	  Supreme	  court	  Decisions	  2001-­‐2009,	  to	  be	  estimated	  In	  contrast	  to	  Becker	  (1968),	  Pradiptyo	  (2007)	  argued	  that	  as	  opposed	  to	  other	  disposals,	  fines	  was	  not	  the	  best	  punishment.	  	  This	  is	  related	  to	  the	  low	  rate	  of	  payment,	  meanwhile	  fines	  have	  a	  deterrence	  effect	  only	  when	  they	  are	  paid	  by	  offenders.	  In	  the	  U.K.,	  the	  rate	  of	  fine	  payment	  is	  about	   55%	   in	   England	   and	  Wales	   (DCA,	   2004).	   If	   this	   disposition	   rate	  were	   translated	   into	  imprisonment,	   the	   result	   would	   be	   as	   if	   45%	   of	   prisoners	   escaped	   (Bowles	   and	   Pradiptyo,	  2004).	  	  	  Empirical	  studies	  show	  that	  the	  costs	  to	  collect	  fines	  are	  substantial	  and	  may	  increase	  as	  the	  value	  of	  fines	  increases.	  According	  to	  Chapman	  et	  al.	  (2002),	  the	  costs	  of	  collecting	  fines	  in	  the	  U.K.	  is	  almost	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  fines.	  This	  applies	  when	  the	  average	  value	  of	  the	  fine	  is	  £200,	  which	  is	  much	  lower	  than	  the	  average	  social	  costs	  of	  crime.	  In	  addition,	  variations	  in	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the	   costs	   to	   collect	   fines	   in	   the	  U.K.	   are	  high,	   ranging	   from	  11	  pence	   to	  44	  pence	  per	  pound	  collected	  (DCA,	  2004).	  In	   order	   to	   make	   fines	   more	   credible,	   many	   authorities	   have	   to	   adopt	   a	   strategy	   of	  transforming	   the	  values	  of	   fines	   in	  relation	   to	  a	   term	  of	   imprisonment	  period-­‐-­‐-­‐as	  a	  result,	  a	  failure	  to	  pay	  the	  fines	  will	  be	  compensated	  by	  serving	  time	  in	  prison.	  In	  the	  U.S.,	  for	  instance,	  25%	   of	   convicts	   sentenced	   by	   state	   courts	   in	   the	   year	   2000	   received	   fines	   as	   additional	  penalties	   (U.S.	  DOJ,	   2003).	   In	   Israel	   during	  1997-­‐2000,	   fines	  were	  used	   in	   combination	  with	  other	  penalties	  in	  34.7%	  of	  the	  cases	  (Einat,	  2004).	  The	  use	  of	  complementary	  sanctions	  shows	  that	   fines	   in	   themselves	   are	   not	   sufficient	   as	   a	   credible	   sentence.	   Furthermore,	   the	   costs	   of	  policing	  and	  enforcing	  fines	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	   lower	  than	  other	  types	  of	  sentences,	  and	  the	  higher	  the	  fine,	  the	  higher	  the	  costs	  of	  enforcing	  and	  policing	  it.	  Any	  attempt	  to	  increase	  the	  value	  of	  fines	  may	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  defaults.	  In	  turn,	  this	  gives	  rise	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	   inmates	   in	  prison	  which	  may	  affect	   to	  prison	  overcrowded.	  As	  a	  result,	   fines	  may	  not	  be	  a	  good	  solution	  when	  tackling	  overcrowded	  prisons.	  Table	  8	  shows	  that	  none	  of	  independent	  variables	  was	  significant	  in	  affecting	  the	  likelihood	  of	  judges	   to	   sentence	   offenders	   with	   subsidiary	   of	   fines.	   In	   order	   to	   make	   fines	   credible,	  imprisonment	   should	   be	   a	   complementary	   punishment	  with	   fines.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   finding	  shows	   that	   the	  decision	   to	  sentence	  with	  subsidiary	  of	   fines	  do	  not	   taken	   into	  consideration	  the	  value	  of	  the	  fines	  itself.	  This	  result	  shows	  that	  the	  credibility	  of	  fines	  	  as	  a	  deterrence	  tool	  to	  prevent	  potential	  offenders	  to	  involve	  in	  corruption	  in	  Indonesia	  is	  questionable.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  subsidiary	  punishment	  for	  fines	  is	  asset	  recovery	  or	  imprisonment.	  Based	  on	  the	  anticorruption	  act	  2001,	  for	  every	  fine	  worth	  Rp	  50	  million	  ($5000)	  is	  equivalent	  to	  12	  months	   imprisonment	  or	  approximately	  Rp4.2	  million	  ($420)	  per	  month.	  Nevertheless	  this	   formula	  is	  never	  been	  followed	  by	  judges	  in	  all	  courts	  when	  they	  decided	  the	  subsidiary	  sentence	  for	  fines.	  In	  one	  case,	  an	  offender	  was	  sentenced	  to	  pay	  fines	  Rp	  100	  million	  and	  the	  subsidiary	   sentences	   are	   asset	   recovery	  or	   imprisonment	   for	  2	  months.	   	   In	   another	   case,	   an	  offender	  was	   fines	  with	  an	   identical	  amount,	  however,	  he/she	  received	  subsidiary	  sentences	  asset	  recovery	  or	  imprisonment	  for	  6	  months.	  	  Ideally	  the	  offenders	  should	  be	  sentenced	  with	  subsidiary	  punishment	  two	  years	  imprisonment,	  however	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  support	  that	  judges	  follow	  this	  rule	  closely.	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European	  countries	  tend	  to	  use	  fines	  more	  intensively	  than	  other	  developed	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Israel.	  In	  1986,	  for	  instance,	  81%	  of	  adult	  offenders	  in	  Germany	  were	  ordered	  to	  pay	  fines	  (Tonry,	  1997).	  In	  addition,	  fine	  payment	  covers	  91%	  of	  court	  dispositions	  in	  Finland	  in	   1979.	   In	   the	   U.S.,	   however,	   fines	   have	   been	   used	   more	   often	   as	   an	   additional	   penalty,	  combined	  with	  a	  primary	  penalty	  of	  either	  imprisonment	  or	  community	  service,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  sole	  sanction.	  In	  year	  2000,	  of	  28,810	  convicts	  in	  the	  75	  largest	  counties,	  only	  1%	  received	  a	  fine	  as	  a	  sole	  sanction	  (U.S.	  DOJ,	  2003).	  Similarly,	  Einat	  (2004)	  reported	  that	   in	  Israel	  during	  1997-­‐2000	  fines	  were	  used	  as	  a	  sole	  sanction	  for	  only	  11%	  of	  cases	  on	  average.	  The	   ineffectiveness	   of	   a	   small	   fine	  was	   reported	  by	  Gneezy	   and	  Rustichini	   (2004),	   based	  on	  findings	  from	  their	  experiment.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  imposing	  a	  small	  fine	  fails	  to	  reduce	  the	  unwanted	  behaviour.	  On	   the	   contrary,	   it	   increases	   the	   tendency	   to	   repeat	   the	  behaviour	   for	  which	  fines	  were	  imposed.	  They	  argue	  that	  a	  fine	  will	  reduce	  the	  unwanted	  behaviour	  only	  if	  it	  is	   imposed	   on	   a	   large	   scale.	   While	   this	   argument	   seems	   appealing,	   in	   the	   area	   of	   criminal	  justice	  there	  is	  an	  upper	  limit	  on	  the	  fines	  imposed,	  which	  is	  the	  wealth	  of	  offenders.	  	  





SC_Compensation	  =	  the	  Supreme	  court	  sentenced	  offenders	  to	  pay	  compensation,	  1	  =	  Yes,	  0	  =	  Otherwise.	  
SC_Subs_compensation=	  the	  Supreme	  court	  sentenced	  offenders	  with	  subsidiary	  toward	  compensation,	  1	  =	  
Yes,	  0	  =	  Otherwise.	  
	  Table	  9	  shows	  the	   likelihood	  of	  defendants	   to	  be	  sentenced	  with	  compensation	  order	  by	   the	  supreme	  court	  tends	  to	  decrease	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  type	  of	  occupations	  if	  the	  defendants	  are	  members	  of	  the	  parliament.	  Similarly,	  the	  higher	  the	  explicit	  cost	  inflicted	  by	  members	  of	  the	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parliament,	   the	   lesser	   the	   likelihood	   to	   receive	   compensation	   order.	   With	   respect	   to	   the	  compensation	  order,	  the	  supreme	  judges	  tend	  to	  have	  opposite	  views	  with	  their	  counterparts	  in	  district	  courts.	  The	  other	  explanatory	  variables	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  This	  means	  that	  when	  the	  supreme	  judges	  made	  their	  decisions	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  sentence	  compensation	  order,	  they	  did	  not	  taken	  into	  consideration	  defendants’	  age,	  gender,	  occupation	  and	  also	  the	  value	  of	  financial	  punishment	  prosecuted.	  	  According	   to	   Anti	   Corruption	   Act	   20/2001,	   there	   is	   no	   particular	   term	  which	   regulates	   the	  compensation.	  Nevertheless,	   according	   to	   Indonesia	  Criminal	  Code	   (KUHP)	   apart	   from	   fines,	  judges	  have	  been	  permitted	  to	  sentenced	  offenders	  with	  other	  types	  of	  financial	  punishments	  including:	   compensation,	   seizure	   of	   evidence	   (asset),	   court	   costs	   and	   other	   offence.	   Some	  prosecutors	  tend	  to	  prosecute	  defendant	  to	  pay	  the	  compensation	  as	  much	  as	  the	  explicit	  costs	  that	   they	   inflicted	   to	   the	   society.	   Nevertheless,	   none	   of	   judges	   in	   both	   district	   and	   supreme	  courts	   sentenced	   defendants	   to	   pay	   compensation	   as	   much	   as	   the	   explicit	   costs	   that	   they	  inflicted.	  	  Similar	  to	  the	  fines,	  the	  compensation	  order	  has	  a	  deterrence	  effect	  if	  it	  is	  paid.	  The	  credibility	  of	   compensation	   order	   may	   be	   achieved	   if	   imprisonment	   was	   used	   as	   a	   complementary	  punishment	  in	  the	  case	  for	  which	  offenders	  cannot	  afford	  to	  pay	  the	  compensation	  order.	  	  The	  result	  shows	  that	  judges’	  decisions	  to	  sentence	  offenders	  with	  subsidiary	  of	  compensation	  order	  was	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  value	  of	  the	  social	  cost	  and	  also	  the	  value	  of	  compensation	  order	  imposed	  to	  offenders.	  Instead,	  several	  factors	  which	  significantly	  affect	  the	  likelihood	  of	  sentencing	  offenders	  with	   subsidiary	  of	   compensation	  order	  were:	   a)	   age;	   b)	   Jawa;	   c)	   State-­‐owned	  enterprise	  employee;	  and	  d)	   the	   interaction	  between	  State-­‐owned	  enterprise	  and	   the	  social	  cost	  of	  corruption.	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Table	  9:	  Logistic	  Regression	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  compensation	  	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  SC_Compensation_YN	   Dependent	  Variable:	  SC_Subs_Compensation	  
Sample(adjusted):	  4	  831;	  Included	  observations:	  
517;	  Excluded	  observations:	  311+A99	  
Sample(adjusted):	  4	  831;	  Included	  observations:	  
517;	  Excluded	  observations:	  311	  	  
	  	   Coeff.	   S.E	   Prob.	  	  	   	  	   Coeff.	   S.E	   Prob.	  	  	  
C	   -­‐2.934	   3.225	   0.363	   C	   -­‐2.88	   2.276	   0.206	  
DC_Compensation_YN	   4.101	   0.362	   0.000***	   SC_Subs_Compensation_YN	   0.004	   0.009	   0.662	  
Gender	   0.525	   0.572	   0.359	   Gender	   0.586	   0.431	   0.175	  
Log(Age)	   0.318	   0.734	   0.665	   Log(Age)	   -­‐0.076	   0.504	   0.88	  
D_Jawa	   0.756	   0.32	   0.018**	   D_Jawa	   0.244	   0.22	   0.267	  
D_Greater	  Jakarta	   -­‐1.272	   0.509	   0.012**	   D_Greater	  Jakarta	   -­‐0.523	   0.367	   0.155	  
D_SOE_empl.	   6.184	   4.574	   0.176	   D_SOE_empl.	   2.505	   2.529	   0.322	  
D_MP	   7.834	   3.642	   0.032**	   D_MP	   4.333	   2.937	   0.14	  
D_Private	   0.311	   2.789	   0.911	   D_Private	   1.053	   1.961	   0.591	  
D_Appeal_HC	   -­‐0.922	   0.452	   0.042**	   D_Appeal_HC	   1.589	   0.367	   0.00***	  
D_JudRev	   0.291	   0.421	   0.49	   D_JudRev	   0.359	   0.299	   0.229	  
Log_ExplicitCost	   -­‐0.023	   0.091	   0.8	   Log_ExplicitCost	   0.029	   0.067	   0.665	  
Log_ExpCost*D_BUMN	   -­‐0.273	   0.219	   0.211	   Log_ExpCost*D_BUMN	   -­‐0.106	   0.123	   0.39	  
Log_ExpCost*D_MP	   -­‐0.393	   0.185	   0.034**	   Log_ExpCost*D_MP	   -­‐0.152	   0.15	   0.311	  
Log_ExpCost*D_Private	   0.011	   0.142	   0.937	   Log_ExpCost*D_Private	   -­‐0.038	   0.1	   0.702	  
Mean	  dependent	  var	   	  	   	  	   0.609	   Mean	  dependent	  var	   	  	   	  	   0.472	  
S.E.	  of	  regression	  
	   	  
0.339	   S.E.	  of	  regression	  
	   	  
0.473	  
Sum	  squared	  resid	  
	   	  
57.571	   Sum	  squared	  resid	  
	   	  
112.4	  
Log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐193.4	   Log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐322.9	  
Restr.	  log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐345.9	   Restr.	  log	  likelihood	  
	   	  
-­‐357.5	  
LR	  statistic	  (11	  df)	  
	   	  
305	   LR	  statistic	  (11	  df)	  
	   	  
69.3	  
Probability(LR	  stat)	  
	   	  
0	   Probability(LR	  stat)	  
	   	  
0	  
	  	  	  	  McFadden	  R-­‐squared	   	  	   	  	   0.441	   	  	  	  	  McFadden	  R-­‐squared	   	  	   	  	   0.097	  
Source:	  The	  Supreme	  court	  Decisions	  2001-­‐2009,	  to	  be	  estimated	  It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   ot	   all	   compensation	   orders	   were	   accompanied	   by	   subsidiary	  compensation	   in	   the	   form	  of	  either	  asset	   recovery	  or	   imprisonment.	  Even	   if	   a	   compensation	  order	   were	   accompanied	   with	   asset	   recovery	   or	   imprisonment	   to	   improve	   the	   deterrence	  effect	   of	   the	   compensation,	   it	   turns	   out	   that	   the	   actual	   subsidiary	   orders	   tend	   to	   be	   more	  lenient	  relative	  to	  the	  idealised	  subsidiary	  orders.	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Conclusion	  The	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  show	  that	  most	  likely	  judges	  in	  all	  level	  of	  courts	  do	  not	  follow	  the	  guidance	  on	  the	  intensity	  of	  punishment	  closely,	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  anti	  corruption	  act	  20/2001.	  The	   lack	   of	   consistency	   in	   determining	   the	   intensity	   of	   punishments	   in	   sentencing	   has	  weakend	  the	  deterrence	  effect	  of	  the	  punishments.	  The	  prosecution	  can	  be	  analysed	  as	  a	  bargaining	  problem.	  On	  the	  contrary	  to	  the	  theory,	  the	  size	  of	  pie	  shrinking	  rapidly	  by	  the	  time	  the	  cases	  have	  been	  prosecuted.	  On	  the	  average,	  the	  value	  of	   financial	  punishment	  only	   covers	  60%	  of	   the	   total	   explicit	   social	   cost	  of	   corruption.	  The	  explicit	  cost	  of	  corruption	  were	  Rp	  73.1	  trillion	  (about	  US	  $8.49	  billion),	  however	  the	  total	  financial	  punishment	  imposed	  by	  the	  supreme	  court	  were	  Rp	  5.31	  trillion	  (about	  US$	  617.44	  million).	  	  Obviously,	  this	  discrepancy	  cannot	  be	  redeemed	  by	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  and	  in	  the	  end	  the	  taxpayers	  have	  to	  pay	  the	  burden	  inflicted	  by	  the	  corruptors.	  	  The	   logistic	   regression	   analyses	   show	   that	   for	   all	   types	   of	   punishment,	   the	   likelihood	   of	  sentences	   do	   not	   correspond	   with	   the	   social	   cost	   of	   corruption	   inflicted	   by	   the	   offenders.	  Instead,	  there	  are	  strong	  tendencies	  that	  judges	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  lenient	  toward	  offenders	  with	  certain	   occupations.	   The	   sentences	   have	   been	   conducted	   idiosyncratically	   and	   they	   are	   far	  from	   being	   consistent	   with	   the	   guidance	   of	   sentences	   as	   stated	   in	   the	   Anti	   Corruption	   Act	  20/2001.	  The	   implication	  of	   this	   findings	   is	   that	   the	  deterrence	  effect	  of	   the	  Anti	  Corruption	  Act	  20/2001	  and	   the	   role	  of	  KPK	   in	  erradicating	  corruption	  may	  be	   jeopardised.	  Even	   if	   the	  existence	  of	  KPK	  may	  improve	  the	  detection	  rate	  of	  corruption	  cases,	  however	  as	  judges	  tend	  to	   sentence	   offenders	   idiosyncratically,	   offenders	   who	   inflict	   high	   cost	   of	   corruption	   may	  receive	  light	  sentences.	  Obviously	  this	  weakend	  the	  deterrence	  effect	  of	  the	  punishment,	  and	  potentially	  jeopardise	  corruption	  erradication	  movements.	  	  	  The	   explicit	   cost	   of	   corruption	   is	   only	   a	   small	   fraction	   from	   the	   social	   cost	   of	   corruption,	   as	  Brand	  and	  Price	  (2000)	  defined	  that	  the	  social	  cost	  of	  crime	  includes	  the	  costs	  in	  anticipation	  of	  crime,	  the	  costs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  crime	  and	  the	  costs	  in	  reaction	  of	  crime.	  The	  data	  show	  that	  corruption	  are	  mostly	  committed	  by	  people	  with	  medium-­‐high	  income	  and	  they	  usually	  have	  good	   careers,	   we	   suggest	   that	   a	   private	   solution	   could	   be	   implemented	   in	   punishing	   the	  offenders.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  total	  financial	  punishment	  should	  be	  sufficient	  to	  compensate	  the	  social	  cost	  of	  corruption.	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Appendices	  
Appendix	  A:	  Summary	  of	  Anti	  Corruption	  Act	  20/2001	  
Section
/	  Part	   Offence	  Types	  

















Offering	  a	  bribe	  to	  Civil	  Servants	  or	  
Bureaucrats	  	   1	   Or	   50	   5	   Or	   250	   	  	  
Sec.	  5	  
Part	  2	  
Civil	  Servants	  or	  Bureaucrats	  receive	  
bribery	  as	  mentioned	  in	  parts	  1A	  &	  1B	  




Offering	  a	  bribe	  to	  any	  court	  staff	  and	  
expert	  witnesses	  to	  alter	  their	  decision	  in	  
the	  favour	  of	  the	  individual	  who	  offer	  a	  
bribe.	  	   3	   And	   150	   15	   And	   750	   	  	  
Sec	  .6	  
part	  2	  
Any	  court	  staff	  and	  expert	  witnesses	  who	  
received	  a	  bribe	  as	  mentioned	  in	  part	  1a	  
and	  1b	  above.	  	   3	   And	   150	   15	   And	   750	   	  	  
Sec	  .	  7	  	  
Part	  1a	  
Embezzlement	  of	  procurement	  of	  
government	  goods	  and	  services	  provision	  	   2	  
And	  
or	   100	   7	  
And	  
or	   350	   	  	  
Sec	  .	  8	  
Fraud	  and	  Forgery	  committed	  by	  
Bureaucrats	  for	  their	  own	  benefits.	  	   3	   And	   150	   15	   And	   750	   	  	  
Sec	  .	  9	  
Fraud	  and	  forgery	  committed	  by	  
Bureaucrats	  in	  attempts	  to	  destroy	  and	  
damage	  administrative	  evidence	  which	  
may	  be	  used	  for	  prosecution.	   1	   And	   50	   5	   And	   250	   	  	  
Sec.	  
10a	  
Damaging	  and	  loosing	  any	  kind	  of	  
administrative	  evidence	  which	  can	  be	  
used	  for	  prosecution.	  	   2	   And	   100	   7	   And	   350	   	  	  
Sec.	  11	  
Civil	  Servants	  or	  Bureaucrats	  received	  
present	  or	  promise	  due	  to	  their	  position	  in	  
the	  government,	  and	  the	  present	  may	  
hinder	  them	  to	  work	  professionally.	  	   1	  
And	  
or	   50	   5	  
and




Receiving	  gratification	  or	  discount	  for	  
procurement	  by	  Bureaucrats,	  court	  staff,	  
expert	  witnesses	  who	  is	  believed	  is	  going	  




Extortion	  committed	  by	  bureaucrats,	  court	  





Any	  gratification	  which	  is	  suspected	  as	  a	  
form	  of	  bribery	  to	  bureaucrats.	  
	   4	   and	   200	   20	   And	   1000	   Live	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